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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this project is to explore the impact of specific youth voter mobilization 
techniques as potential reasons for the increase in youth voter turnout in the 2008 Iowa 
Democratic caucuses. Through a focus group with high school and college students and 
young professionals as well as interviews with presidential and interest group staff, campus 
coordinators and youth leaders, I will investigate the following questions: Why did young 
people attend the caucuses? What role did peer-to-peer contact and social networking 
opportunities play during the caucus season? What role did campaigns and civic groups play 
in voter training and caucus information? What role did the candidate and their staffs play in 
asking people to participate in the political process? To begin, it is essential to be familiar 
with the political landscape of Iowa. 
Iowa, with its first in the nation status on the presidential nominating calendar, has the 
honor and the inconvenience of receiving a great deal of attention from the media, 
presidential candidates, and campaigns alike. Historian Richard Norton Smith has described 
the Iowa caucus process in the following manner:  
This is the state historically where someone can come in with very little in the 
way of financial resources or name recognition and, because it is a small, rural 
state where people take very seriously the process of vetting these candidates, 
it is theoretically possible for someone to catapult themselves into the front 
rank (January 3, 2008, News Hour with Jim Lehrer). 
 
On January 3, 2008, and for the full year previous to that, Iowa took center stage as the 
careful inspector of presidential candidates. 
The 2008 Democratic presidential candidates included the well known, the lesser 
known, and the dark horses. The field of candidates has been described on different 
occasions as “a great field of candidates,” “historic in nature,” and “extremely capable” (The 
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Washington Post 2007, A2 and NPR 2008). Political pundits and researchers alike have 
questioned whether the nature of the times, the open-seat presidential election, the harsh 
partisan era, or a rise in civic involvement increased voter turnout in the 2008 Iowa caucuses. 
In fact Democratic voter turnout in the 2008 caucuses shattered the previous attendance 
record set in 2004. In that year, 124,331 people attended the Iowa Democratic caucuses, 
while in 2008 there were almost double that number with a record-breaking attendance of 
239,582 (Iowa Democratic Party 2008). This is significant as caucuses have long been 
perceived as confusing and only for “die hard” Democratic activists. While the numbers have 
increased, the turnout is still small. For perspective, in 2004 only 18% of eligible Democrats 
participated. In 2008, 34% of the 701,285 registered Democrats, which also were open to 
registered Independents and Republicans (Iowa Democratic Party 2008).  
Increased voter interest in the 2008 presidential primary has spread across the nation: 
since the kickoff of the 2008 primary season in Iowa, 3.5 million new voters have registered 
to vote in order to participate in presidential primaries and caucuses across the country 
(Thomas 2008).  The overall voter turnout numbers themselves are striking, but the 
demographics of new voters statewide and nationally tell an exciting story about youth 
involvement. Iowa’s precinct caucuses saw youth voter turnout (voters 17.5 to 29 years old) 
increase from 4% of eligible youth voters in 2004 to 13% of eligible youth voters in 2008 
(CIRCLE 2008). The typical “apathetic youth voter” seems to have awakened. In the 2008 
Iowa caucuses, young people caucused at about the same percentage as older Iowans 
(Connery 2007).  
In identifying the root causes of increased turnout, this project can impact the way 
campaigns and candidates treat young voters in the future. Increased youth voter turnout has 
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the potential to change the political playbook of the past and rewrite the rules of campaigning 
for elected office. Indeed, increased youth voter turnout could have a dramatic effect on 
democracy as a whole and on the way people in power address issues and needs important to 
young voters.  Typically, the less active in government are often heard less and their issues 
ignored. An increase in youth voter turnout could dramatically shift the political landscape 
and strategy for those in power and those seeking power.  
Thanks to the work of political scientists using field experiments, civic organizations 
and campaigns are benefiting from research on youth voter mobilization strategies that work. 
In the past several years there have been reports titled: “A Guide to Reaching Young Voters: 
Are You Talking to Me?”(Harvard IOP n.d.), “Make Them Pay Attention to Us” (Walker 
2006), “Young Voters: Lessons Learned” (Harvard IOP 2005) and “Young Voter 
Mobilization Tactics: A Compilation of the Most Recent Research on Traditional and 
Innovative Voter Turnout Techniques” (GWU 2005). Civic organizations have aggressively 
worked to move these publications from the world of journal publications and research into 
the campaign arena for candidates, staff, and political parties to review. 
The objective of this project is to explore the reasons for increased youth voter 
turnout in the Iowa caucuses. As such, this project begins with a summary of prior research 
on voter turnout and voter behavior theories. Next, information on youth participation in 
political and civic life and historical trends in youth voting is provided. I conclude with a 
review of in-depth studies on voter mobilization, including an analysis of the effectiveness of 
specific youth voter mobilization techniques. The underlying assumption and research 
questions posed seek to address why Democratic youth voter turnout in Iowa increased. The 
section provides three clear research questions to be evaluated. Specifically, that peer-to-peer 
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contact, voter training, and a candidate “asking” someone to be involved in the political 
process are three techniques utilized that caused youth voter turnout to increase. With the 
foundation of past research, the data and methodology sections introduce the dependent and 
independent variables that will be studied; provides information on the data obtained through 
the focus group, individual interviews, and survey data; and looks at the case study 
methodology used for analyzing the information. Using qualitative and quantitative data and 
journalistic reports, the results are documented and then analyzed in the discussion section. 
The conclusion of this work ends with addressing future areas of research in the area of voter 
mobilization techniques. 
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Chapter 2.  Previous Research 
It is necessary to study voter behavior theories and voting demographics and 
understand analysis on the impact outside influences have on the individual decision making 
process. This information sets the groundwork for my inquiry that looks at a specific voting 
population, youth voters, to identify similarities and differences within the larger voting 
population. 
This first part of the literature review looks at theories and data on why people vote. 
There is an emphasis on the political socialization process, theory, and socioeconomic status 
(SES) variables that describe likely voters. I then move to study how political efficacy, 
anxiety, and civic duty influence an individuals’ ability or desire to vote. Subsequent to that, 
youth voter trends and theories are explained and the civic engagement and apathy of youth 
is analyzed. This review ends with a discussion of youth voter strategies, mobilization 
techniques, and messages targeted toward young voters.  
Many political scientists have attempted to apply formal theory to address the 
question of why people vote. On one extreme, Downs’ paradox of voting (1957), using the 
rational choice framework, supposes that if individuals are rational, they would not vote. 
Applying that theory, the costs of information collection and processing are too high for the 
realization that voters will only receive collective benefits. It is known that Downs’ 
assertions tend to be more false than true as many people do vote, and there have been 
several attempts to solve the paradox such as Riker’s consumption benefits (1968), yet none 
completely answers the question of why individuals vote. Records tell us that most people 
are not voting for the purpose of gaining material benefits.  
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James Q. Wilson (1973), on the other extreme, studies the rewards an individual 
receives from their participation in the political process, and tends to counteract Downs’ 
theory on the paradox of voting and enhances the role that rewards play in the political 
process. Wilson’s framework seeks to find out if people participate to receive something 
tangible (material), to maintain or strengthen friendships or social interaction (solidary), or to 
receive an intrinsic satisfaction from participation (purposive). A discussion of solidary 
benefits is beneficial as I will later reflect on the influence of social networking and peer-to-
peer communications on youth turnout at the polls: “Social networks, in short, create solidary 
rewards and bestow them, selectively, on those who act in the common interest” (Wilson 
1973 as cited in Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
When theoretical approaches were not able to accurately assess why people voted, 
scientists such as Verba and Nie (1972) began to look at certain variables to explain 
individual turnout decisions. Using demographic descriptors such as income, education, and 
occupation, these scientists set up a SES model to identify trends in voting over time. These 
factors play a role in the development of one’s perceptions about politics and often provide 
clear indicators of who votes. The wealthy vote more than the poor, and the more educated 
are more likely to take part in politics than the less educated (Verba and Nie 1972). It makes 
sense that those who are in educational settings where skills such as newspaper reading, 
debate, and public speaking are refined would be more likely to seek out and discuss political 
information. Well educated individuals are also more likely to be able to sort through voter 
registration requirements and bureaucratic obstacles such as those documented by Richard 
Timpone (1998). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) paint a detailed picture of those involved in 
political activity in both electoral and governmental politics. They highlight that whites are 
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more likely to vote than African Americans and those individuals with the most financial 
resources are more likely to vote. The older you are, the more likely you are to vote. In 
addition, your occupation and your occupational interests may increase your likelihood of 
voting.  
It was Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) who began to push further to look at the 
correlation of individual demographic characteristics of education, income, and age and their 
relationships among each other and question how turnout “will be felt in the fate of policy 
proposals” (114). To date, one of the most complete voting behavior models has been 
proposed by Miller and Shanks (1996), which used the National Election Study (NES) data 
from 1980 – 1992. They created a building block model which gives importance to: “voters’ 
social and economic characteristics; party identification; policy related predispositions; 
current policy preferences and perceptions of the economy and other conditions; 
retrospective evaluations of the incumbent president; evaluations of candidates’ personal 
qualities; and prospective evaluations of the candidates and their parties” (313). This 
information is helpful in thinking through how to gauge the contribution of these variables to 
voting decisions throughout the process. Beyond particular demographics, there are certain 
indicators that influence how a person thinks about the political process. 
Political socialization, a lifelong process through which our political cognition, 
attitudes, and opinions are shaped, is impacted by a host of things including family and 
instilled family values, mass media, religion, political party affiliation, schools, and friends. 
The breadth and depth of information on this subject is extensive. The decision to participate 
is impacted by family, friends, and neighbors and individual interactions with them on voting 
topics (McClurg 2003). In fact, research shows that party identification and candidate 
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selection are often impacted by the views of a spouse or parent (Nickerson 2008). In 
addition, political knowledge can be formed through life experiences and by interpersonal 
interactions and conversations that are validated through media reports which “constitute a 
citizen’s web of communicative engagement” (Kaid, Tedesco, Bystrom, McKinney 2003, 
1281). Using NES data, Yang Lin (2003) found a significant positive relationship between 
internal political efficacy and communication between voters:  
This finding demonstrates that citizens who engage in interpersonal discussion about 
politics with a greater number of fellow citizens are more likely to have confidence in 
their ability to make sense of and to get involved in the political process (59).  
 
The effect that political efficacy, an individual’s confidence in his or her political 
knowledge, impacts individual voter turnout must also be considered. This is a critical 
concept -if voter participation is to increase, political efficacy of voters must increase. Lack 
of information about the candidates and political issues are cited most often by non-voters as 
the most important reason for not voting. Indeed, the research shows that the less information 
individuals have, the less likely they are to participate in the electoral process (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996). Therefore, it is of great importance to unpack the concept of political 
knowledge. Using NES data and survey questions, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) work to 
break this idea down by creating a series of quizzes that seek to measure individual factual 
knowledge of candidates, issues, and political institutions. They find the average level of 
individual political information is low.  
While Delli Carpini and others see a quiz of political information as an effective tool 
in measuring political knowledge, critics are quick to point out that knowledge is not the only 
thing that impacts political participation; many factors, including political socialization, 
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political efficacy, emotions, and enthusiasm, play a significant role in the choice to vote and 
get involved in campaigns (Marcus and MacKuen 1993). 
Political efficacy, as a theory, has been defined as an individual’s feeling that he or 
she can affect or influence the political process, and researchers have broken this concept 
down to distinguish between internal and external influence on the political process 
(Campbell 1960, Bandura 1977). External efficacy addresses the responsiveness of political 
institutions to individual demands, while internal efficacy addresses one’s own confidence in 
political knowledge and feelings about the ability to participate (Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 
1991). Kaid, Tedesco, and McKinney (2007) honed in on the idea of internal efficacy by 
providing a new theory of political information efficacy. In their research, they explore 
certain campaign communications and focus on “whether the voter’s confidence in his or her 
own political knowledge and its sufficiency to engage the political process (to vote) 
improved” (1096). In her research, Kaid (2004) concludes that as individuals’ exposure to 
particular campaign messages increases, information efficacy is positively impacted. There is 
promise in research that shows people with increased internal political efficacy are 1.7% 
more likely to volunteer, 2.5% more likely to donate money, 2.9% more likely to vote, and 
5.6% more likely to persuade others (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). These numbers make a 
strong case for campaigns and educators to provide a strong pedestal for the future electorate. 
In an examination of another internal efficacy factor, Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 
(2000) studied the effects that anxiety has on political learning and conclude that there is an 
interactive effect between anxiety and voting. When people are anxious or threatened, they 
tend to pay more attention. Moreover, Marcus and Mackuen (1993) presented data that 
indicate that enthusiasm directly affects voting preference and positively affects campaign 
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involvement. A sense of civic duty also plays a role in the prediction of who votes. Campbell 
et al., in The American Voter (1960), pointed out that many individuals have been exposed to 
the idea throughout their lifetime that voting is a duty as a citizen in the country, and those 
with a strong sense that voting is a responsibility are more likely to vote.  
While the research on voter decision making assists in voter prediction, in the last 
three decades of the 20th century the predictions have not held true as overall turnout has 
waned regardless of generally accepted predictors. Voter turnout in presidential elections has 
declined since the 1960s. In 1988, only half of the electorate cast a ballot in the presidential 
contest (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). With voter participation steadily decreasing, political 
scientists seek to further understand the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic influences on voter 
behavior.  
Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) put forth an explanatory resource model of 
political participation which seeks to look at individual skills that are essential to political 
activity -time, money, and civic skills. In compiling a large-N citizen participation study, the 
research focused on voluntary activity in politics, churches, and organizations. The civic 
skills acquired from these organizations are documented to be transferable and of benefit to 
increase political efficacy. Civic skills, or skill acts, show a significant direct correlation to 
level of education and home life. In their findings on resources and political acts, the research 
finds a continuing high correlation between education and voting, but encourages the reader 
to pay attention to a “revised picture of voting as an act that is driven very strongly by 
political interest” (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, 283).  
This inquiry now turns its focus to the youth voter. The dependent variable in this 
research is youth voter turnout, so it is critical to lay the foundation and understand the over 
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time information on youth voting. In looking historically at low youth voter participation 
rates, researchers cite voting behavior theories such as generational theory (Craig and 
Bennett 1997) and the life cycle theory (Campbell, et al. 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993). Others argue youth apathy is a result of a cycle of neglect between political leaders 
and young voters as posed by Richard Thau, president of Third Millennium (2000), the 
leading national organization of young adults that offers solutions to long-term domestic 
economic problems. The generational theory states that those with a strong attachment to the 
political process which was developed early in life, such as the FDR New Deal generation or 
the 1960s protest generation, remain called to participate in record numbers throughout their 
lives. The life cycle theory posits that young people become more active as they get older 
and settled in homes and with families. Moreover, the benefits of voting appear to be more 
tangible as voters get older. Prior research, however, suggests that it is difficult to find 
support for either the generational or life cycle theory as there are so many variables which 
influence political behavior. During the 2004 election, “neglection” (Third Millennium 2000) 
was often cited as the reason for low youth turnout, stating that a cycle of neglect takes place 
when politicians do not pay much attention to young adults because they do not vote enough; 
and, to some extent, young adults do not know enough to vote because political ad 
campaigns and candidates ignore them.  
Kaid, Johnston, and Hale (1989) use the term “political malaise” to address data that 
shows there has been a significant decline in political activism between 1960 and 1992 
(Wattenberg 2002). While the 26th amendment in 1972 broadened the electorate to include 
18, 19, and 20 year olds, the proportion of the overall voting population experienced a 
decline and the trend has continued beyond the 1970s. Since 1980, people under the age of 
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30, according to NES data, have shown a significant decline in “following what’s going on in 
government and public affairs” (NES 2004). A 2002 Center for Information & Research on 
Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) study highlighted that only one of every three 
youth voters saw voting as a civic obligation or duty while far more saw voting as a choice or 
a right. While this study is not generalizable due to its small dataset, Martin Wattenberg 
(2008) is quick to point out that the concept of voting as a choice rather than a duty poses a 
new threat to the continuing reduction in youth voter turnout numbers not seen in prior 
studies.  
The typical research profile of a young person is that they don’t vote and they are not 
involved in the political process. Declining youth voter turnout has been well documented by 
the media. In 2004, a content analysis on media coverage of youth during the presidential 
election found 372 stories over an 11-month period. While many of the stories were neutral 
or positive and focused on youth civic engagement, anywhere from 30-40% of the stories 
were negative and included portrayals of youth as “insignificant, apathetic, frivolous, or 
ignorant” (Williams 2007). Does the message young people receive from the media impact 
their perception and political efficacy? It may, and other reasons for low turnout among 
youth include poor quality civics education, changes in socialization experiences, and 
changes in the media through which individuals receive information (Patterson 2002). 
While youth voter turnout has remained low for decades, a hotly contested 
presidential election in 1992 brought a spike in youth voter turnout only to return to a low 
rate in 2000. However, 2004 saw an 11% increase in which 47% of 18-24 year-old eligible 
voters voted (CIRCLE 2007), 2006 saw midterm election turnout increase from 22% of 
eligible voters in 2002 to 25% in 2006 (CIRCLE 2007), and 2008 continues to exhibit record 
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youth turnout in the primaries. A 2007 Harvard University Institute of Politics (IOP) Fall 
Survey found that 41% of young adults (18-24) would definitely be voting in their primary or 
caucus, while 61% would definitely be voting in the general election. Sixty percent of those 
surveyed said they were following national political news, and 35% considered themselves to 
be politically engaged or active. In the Spring IOP 2008 Survey, 64% said they would 
definitely be voting, while 16% said they would probably be voting. It is possible that the 
Millennial Generation is charting a new course. For example, a CIRCLE study showed that 
voter mobilization in 2004 was high with political parties and student groups registering 
student voters, and an impressive 62% of college students—the Millennial Generation—said 
they encouraged someone else to register to vote (Niemi and Hammer 2004). 
This Millennial Generation (ill-defined, but most commonly considered people born 
between 1985 and 2004) and the tail end of Generation Y (also ill-defined, but most 
commonly considered people born between 1977 and 1994) have shown a significant 
increase in volunteerism rates (Longo and Meyer 2006). In fact, at the same time voting rates 
were decreasing in the 1990s, volunteerism rates were increasing. It is unclear if this is the 
result of massive volunteer opportunities promoted in the schools and made available to 
young people or if this increase in volunteerism was a tangible outlet for young people to feel 
the direct impact of their work. Individual connections with the community through 
volunteerism have led many to speculate that young people are looking for the best avenue to 
participate and make a difference because voting was not providing that outlet (Strama 
1988).  
In assessing student attitudes over time, CIRCLE highlights changing views on civic 
engagement. In the early 1990s, students considered politics irrelevant to their lives, but in 
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2006 and 2007, students talked about politics as a vehicle for change and recognized its 
importance, yet still felt inadequately informed to participate (CIRCLE 2002; Spiker, Lin, 
and Wells 2003). Could it be that Putnam’s (2000) call to action led educators, scientists, and 
government to seek institutional changes to promote civic engagement beyond volunteerism 
to include politics? The country has changed in the last few years and that may be why 
attitudes have shifted over time. Since 2000, Americans have found themselves in a divided 
partisan country, and immersed in war, terrorist attacks, and debt. Perhaps to young people, 
the nature of the times seems different and more serious. Indeed, turnout prediction models, 
such as the “mobilization based” model (Jones, Barth, Kropf and Parry 2008), have 
demonstrated and included the importance of “campaign context, partisan environment, 
polarized political parties, the presence of a close race and robust campaign expenditures” 
(99) in predicting voter turnout. Moreover, in studying the competitiveness of presidential 
campaigns between 1952-1988 using NES data, Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) analysis 
reveals that competitiveness at the top of the ticket increases turnout: citizens are 3% more 
likely to vote and 7.8% more likely to attempt to persuade each other when the race is 
perceived as competitive.  
The way that young people process information and respond to peer-to-peer contact is 
quite important in their decision to vote, and research on young voters’ political information 
and efficacy in the 2004 election confirm that young citizens turned often to friends and 
family to have conversations about politics and important issues (Wells and Dudash 2007). 
This supports a 2005 report by Thomas Patterson that shows that 39% of students in college 
talked politics on a regular basis (Patterson 2007). As previously mentioned, researchers have 
repeatedly shown that, in young people, confidence in their political knowledge is strongly 
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correlated to whether or not they turned out at the polls on Election Day (Kaid, McKinney, 
and Tedesco 1996, 2000). 
With this research in mind, Strachan (2007) encourages political parties to engage 
youth by using active cognitive processing techniques, such as inviting young people into 
face-to-face interpersonal interactions where they are able to sort through contradicting 
evidence and have a discussion about their own political agenda and issues they care about. 
But, in order for active processing to take place, young voters must have positive internal self 
efficacy. Strachan states, “the underpinning reason for young people’s lack of internal 
political efficacy can surely be traced at least in part to the fact that they received their 
political socialization during a time of declining associational life” (2007, 87). But when 
internal self efficacy is present, campaigns can use cognitive processing techniques to talk to 
young people about voting issues. Lodge et al. (1991) highlight that there are many different 
types of decision processing for different types of voters. For some, their decision to support 
candidates may be on the basis of the person and their attributes and others on the basis of 
issue positions. Skaggs and Anthony (2002), however, show that the most compelling factor 
in determining who to vote for is a candidate’s stand on issues. In a 2004 issue salience 
study, Tedesco, McKinney, and Kaid (2007) state that both older and younger voters 
similarly identified their top ranked issues such as the war, education, terrorism, economy, 
and health care. The nuance in the study was that the youth voters were more focused on how 
those issues would impact them individually and less focused on the broad implications of 
the issues.  
Even when young people are called to action by a hotly contested political race, youth 
voters seems to seek an alternative type of politics that is participatory, inclusive, open, 
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creative, and deliberative. Some call this “the politics that is not called politics” (Matthews 
1994). The IOP 2007 report provides context and verification that young people are signing 
petitions, writing emails or letters advocating a position, attending rallies, donating money, 
volunteering, or blogging (IOP 2007). Youth voters want a serious conversation that is free 
from bias, and, over time, they have found themselves increasingly more centrist (Harvard 
IOP 2007). In the Harvard survey data, less partisan messages seemed to work better with 
young voters. More than 4 out of 10 young voters decline to identify themselves as members 
of a political party, while just over 50% of college freshman consider themselves moderates 
or “middle of the road” (IOP 2007). I now transition away from why young people vote to 
study broad voter mobilization theories. 
Mobilization, as defined by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), is “the process by which 
candidates, parties, activists and groups induce other people to participate” (25). In their 
analysis, voting is seen as a two-way street in that it is necessary to have strategic 
mobilization and individual motivation for participation to occur. Using Rosenstone and 
Hansen’s framework, examples of direct mobilization include phone calls, mail solicitations, 
and door-to-door canvassing, while indirect mobilization includes the identification and 
mobilization of leaders who, in turn, mobilize people in their individual networks. 
Mobilization is a strategic choice made by candidates, campaigns, and groups that seek to 
include the largest number of people with the least amount of effort or resources. With 
targeted mobilization, heavy emphasis is put on identifying people who are centrally 
positioned within large social networks and individuals who are likely to respond to outreach 
efforts. 
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Using targeted mobilization in electoral politics means identifying enough votes to 
elect a candidate to office. It is not uncommon to see political parties, campaigns, and interest 
groups all implement identification and GOTV (Get out the Vote) programs. Modern day 
GOTV operations are equipped to turn out candidate and issue supporters based on the 
limited campaign resources available. First, the most likely voters are encouraged to vote. 
This is confirmed by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) who cite that strong partisans are about 
5.3 % more likely to be contacted in a presidential year and that people mobilized by the 
Democratic and Republican parties are 7.8 % more likely to vote.   
The contextual situation of whether a person has been asked to participate must 
remain a factor in mobilization as other intrinsic and extrinsic variables are reviewed. In 
addition to being asked, it is important to look at who asks – the political party, the 
campaign, or the candidate. In his study of the relationship between internal and external 
efficacy, Yang Lin (2006) provides the framework for the two types of political contact -first, 
that between a candidate (and individuals working for the candidate in the campaign) and 
voters, and, second, interpersonal communication between voters. In his framework, 
candidate visits, coffees, door-to-door canvasses by staff, and email all qualify as 
communication with the candidate (and campaign). Conversations between individuals that 
assist in the interpretation of information they receive from the mass media consist of 
interpersonal communication. While there is limited research on the effectiveness of being 
asked, in a 1966 report by Bowman and Boynton, 26% of local political leaders responded 
that they had become active in their political party because they were asked to get involved. 
Of that, at least half had been asked by a neighbor, friend, or relative.  
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In order to effectively comprehend a candidate or campaign “asking,” the researcher 
must go beyond actions and assess the words and rhetoric of a candidate. In an assessment of 
candidate speeches and messages, researchers tend to look at policy-making rhetoric 
(Howard & Hoffman 2007) that was used by candidates. These rhetorical strategies tend to 
address both the issues and “asking” to get involved. It is quite possible that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between support of a candidate’s platform and asking to participate. 
There seems to be little, if any, research on the direct ask of a candidate to an individual to 
participate. Trent and Friedenberg (1995) analyze political campaign communication 
between national candidates and voters and state that interpersonal contact allows for a 
relationship and allows the candidate to be seen as accessible and available. Prior research on 
the role that a sitting president utilizes in office has documented that the president clearly has 
the capacity to mobilize large numbers of people directly based on the size and scope of his 
office (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) state that candidates, 
through the use of new technologies such as television and political ad campaigns, are more 
apt to speak directly to the electorate. Prior research supports the idea that political 
advertising exposes voters to relevant information which influences voters’ evaluations of the 
candidate (Kaid, et al. 2007).  
Presidential campaigns have the ability to call attention to the high stakes and 
magnitude of the election. As pointed out by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), presidential 
elections captivate the media and offer individuals the opportunity to be a player in the 
national government. Presidential candidates are more apt to mobilize the public not for its 
own sake, but for the purpose of winning elections and influencing policies. Regardless of 
motive, the candidates and campaigns are asking people to vote. These voters are more likely 
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to be inspired by a campaign or candidate as greater resources are spent and individual 
contact with voters increase. By far the most effective means of mobilizing voters is face to 
face contact (Green and Gerber, 2000a). In addition, through the use of technologies such as 
television, internet, email, and cell phones, campaigns and candidates are more able to 
directly connect with the voter.   
To portray a complete picture of political participation, it is equally as important to 
study the significance of being asked as to understand the political opportunity structures that 
individuals have available to them in the political process. Hansen (1985) argues that people 
get involved when there are opportunities or avenues available to them. If campaigns provide 
those avenues, more people will get involved. In additional supporting information, both 
Verba and Nie (1972) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) acknowledge the significant role 
that activity in voluntary organizations plays in laying the groundwork for providing a 
trained individual, with a set of leadership skills, to the political realm. 
Since the decline of the youth vote and the call to action to identify ways to improve 
youth voting across the country, several researchers, most notably Nickerson, Green, and 
Gerber, and civic organizations such as CIRCLE, have worked to study the effectiveness of 
certain types of youth voter mobilization techniques used by campaigns and third party 
groups. This work highlights research on peer-to-peer contact, telephone calls, door-to-door 
canvasses, internet and email use, text messaging, and hands-on voter training as well as 
issues of timing and messaging. 
By far the most cost effective and meaningful technique studied has been the use of 
peer-to-peer contact. Electoral campaigns have found great success in youth voter 
mobilization techniques that involve a peer-to-peer element which provides a social network 
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opportunity. Campaigns that focus on social networks seek to capitalize on the bonds of 
friendship; the basic premise is that it is difficult to say no to someone you are familiar with 
or someone with which you have something in common. According to a 2004 New Voters 
Project analysis, peer-to-peer voter registration drives have significant impact, and multiple 
peer-to-peer contacts increase individual likelihood to vote. In a review of criterion for 
targeted mobilization, the most likely people identified as leaders were those who were well 
known, were centrally positioned, had established social networks, were easy to identify, 
were visible, and knew many people (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
Moreover, Nickerson (2006) highlights the effectiveness of volunteer phone calls and 
speculates that the nature of the caller and the type of script matters very much as he saw an 
increase in turnout depending on the age of the volunteer caller. Telephone conversations 
with a peer increased turnout 3-5% (Green and Gerber 2005; Young Voter Strategies 2008), 
and youth callers were more effective than paid, commercial callers, but less effective than 
other techniques. Automatically dialed pre-recorded calls, or “robo calls,” are seen to have no 
effect or a negative effect (Green and Gerber 2004). Door-to-door canvassing is the best 
approach compared to phones and direct mail (Green and Gerber 2005).  
In most of the randomized field experiments, turnout results increased when there 
was face-to-face contact, and greater results were seen when the contact was a peer. In fact, 
door-to-door canvassing from a peer increased turnout 8 -10 % (Green and Gerber 2005, 
Young Voter Strategies 2008). Other studies have found an increase in turnout of 10-20 % in 
response to face-to-face mobilization, peer-to-peer or otherwise (Green and Gerber 2000a). 
While highlighting the success of peer to peer contact, Nickerson (2007) also draws on two 
experiments which did not prove the strength and depth of peer contact, when the peer is not 
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known, but of the same age. A general conclusion drawn would be that peer to peer contact is 
effective; however, there are times when it has not proven as conclusive as others.   
Internet communication also plays an important role in voters’ decision making. In 
2004, more than a quarter of young adults used the Internet to get information on the 
candidates and issues, visit Web pages, and send campaign related messages (Pew Internet 
and American Life Project 2004). The most effective online voter mobilization tools are ones 
where the young voter either opts into the conversation or gets to interact some way (Young 
Voter Strategies, Project with GWU/CIRCLE 2008). Bucy (2004) distinguishes content 
interactivity as when a user interacts with the Web technology and participates in 
interpersonal interactivity, which could involve user-to-user interaction such as Web logs 
(blogs) and online chats. The emphasis on online techniques, which are highly interactive, 
has been shown to increase political information efficacy (Tedesco and Kaid 2000, Tedesco 
2006). As a result, our country has seen an increase in campaigns and voting organizations 
using interactive, two-way forms of online communication among young people. Websites 
usually ask for feedback and offer ways for users to share their opinion. This interactivity is 
seen as a means to reduce cynicism and increase political efficacy among young people. 
 In a 2004 content analysis on the use of blogs, only 8% of the official campaign posts 
were youth targeted (Trammell 2007). Trammell speculates that blogs could be utilized more 
effectively to target youth as blogs are seen as “hip” technology (1255). Indeed, almost half 
of blog readers are under the age of 30 (Pew Internet and American Life Project 2005). It was 
noted that the number of youth-oriented electoral engagement Websites also increased from 
22 in 2002 to 35 in 2004. These websites offer political information, issue discussions, links 
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to other sites, and an interactive experience to solicit feedback and comments (Bennett and 
Xenos 2004). 
As for email, in a series of 13 email experiments across eight states, David Nickerson 
(2006) found no evidence that emails increased voter turnout or boosted rates of registration 
among young voters. Moreover, research shows that old fashioned direct mail—mail sent to 
an individual household—had little impact on youth turnout (Ramirez 2005). Parry, Barth, 
Kropf, and Jones (2008), in a voter turnout survey of competitive 2002 U.S. Senate races,  
found that receipt of targeted campaign materials improves the probability that otherwise 
unlikely participants (seldom voters) will cast ballots up ticket. Moreover, one study shows 
that a quarter of Americans under the age of 25 were mobile-phone only in 2006 (Blumberg 
and Luke 2007), and a study by In-Stat/MDR (2004) predicts that the mobile-phone only 
population will reach nearly 30% of the entire American public by the 2008 presidential 
election. This is important and should push campaigns to consider how to reach out to young 
people in future elections. There have been several studies which cite the efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of texting, potentially an important way to reach young people, although that 
research seems somewhat early and inconclusive (Dale and Strauss 2007).  
Many third-party groups, such as Rock the Vote or Vote or Die, have sought to 
include celebrities as a mechanism to generate an increase in youth voters. In a case study of 
Pennsylvania in 2004, researchers sought to identify whether celebrity appearances and 
endorsements were effective in raising voter turnout or political efficacy. The conclusion was 
that the nature of the race made it difficult to ascertain why people chose to participate. The 
speculation was that young people found a celebrity that they admired or identified with, and 
in turn would support that candidate as a result of the celebrity support.  In 2004, however, 
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John Kerry was given the edge in celebrity endorsements only to lose the election (Payne, 
Hanlon, and Twomey III 2007).    
People respond when given the opportunity to receive solidary benefits. In their 
research through two pilot studies, Addonizio, Green, Glaser, and Ryan (2006) found that 
having a party at the polls and making voter participation social was a promising 
mobilization technique worth more research. In these studies, the researchers held 
community gatherings that enabled people to vote and to celebrate the act and provide 
solidary benefits such as a visit with neighbors or members of their community. When 
studying youth voter participation, especially with high school students, the training is 
equally as important as the socializing with peers.  
There seems to be a paltry amount of information available on voter training or civic 
skills training with high school and college aged students, but there has been great attention 
played to the role that civic education in the classroom plays in increasing voter turnout. It is 
important to distinguish between the teaching of civic skills, defined as “abilities necessary 
for political actions” (Comber 2007, 4), as opposed to teaching knowledge and information 
about civics. Elizabeth Addonizio (2006), in an experiment in which high school students 
were taught to use a voting machine, notes that participants’ subsequent voter turnout rose 
dramatically. In this experiment, first-time voters were brought together for an informational 
meeting that had a social and casual feel to it. In this session, young people were shown how 
to use a voting machine and read the ballot. Based on participation in these sessions, the 
probability that someone would vote increased 19 -24%. Similarly, Green and Gerber (2004) 
highlight the effectiveness of “supertreatments,” those techniques that combine education, 
voting machine demonstrations, and voter registration.  
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In contrast, Philips (2004) finds that a civic education program for high school 
students had no statistically significant effect on turnout or registration of voters. Moreover, 
the Spring 2008 Harvard Institute of Politics Biannual Youth Survey of Politics finds that 
42% of young people aged 18 -24 thought their high school education adequately prepared 
them to be an active participant tin the political process, while 37% disagreed with that 
statement. The survey results highlight the vast inequities in civic education (Galston 2000), 
which tends to fall along socioeconomic lines. Since so many young people receive political 
information through the Internet, there is also a growing digital divide that separates the 
wired and wealthy from the typically minority, lower socioeconomic status, less educated 
individuals. This divide would seem to hold true because research on adults state that the 
more wealthy and well educated one is, the more likely they are to vote (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993). 
In addition to particular techniques used to reach voters, the timing of the voter 
contact is one factor that has significant impact on the youth vote. Research shows that 
contacts with youth close to Election Day matter most. A 2004 New Voters Project reported 
that 80 -85% of potential voters contacted were likely to vote when contacted within the last 
72 hours before polls closed. Those results can be compared to voter contact four to eight 
days prior to an election, in which 79% of potential voters were likely to vote. This finding is 
confirmed by David Niven (2002) who found that the effects of mobilization were dependent 
on the timing of the contact as more distant efforts to mobilize had a much weaker effect on 
turnout. In both studies, the success rate of the contact was higher with voters who had a past 
commitment to voting or to a registered party. Mobilization of the seldom voter proved more 
difficult (Niven 2002).   
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There has been a great deal of research on the types of messages that are included in 
voter contact and whether partisan or nonpartisan messages are more effective. For instance, 
John McNulty (2005) has tested whether a partisan or nonpartisan message was more 
effective with youth, and he concludes that nonpartisan messages were more likely to impact 
turnout. Similarly, Elizabeth Bennion (2005) finds greater effect for student-based 
canvassing with nonpartisan GOTV messages with young people and no effect with older 
voters, while Gerber and Green (2000) find that unaffiliated or independent voters respond 
best to nonpartisan messages. Young people have also made it clear that they dislike harsh 
partisans, spin, and polarized debates and seek authentic opportunities for discussing public 
ideas (CIRCLE 2007).   
While research tends to suggest that nonpartisan messages are most effective, 
randomized field experiments have not provided a similarly clear picture. For example, 
several studies compare partisan vs. nonpartisan and positive vs. negative messages and 
found no statistically significant impact one way or the other (Nickerson, Friedrich, and King 
2006). The same holds true for television advertising (Green 2004). Green and Vavreck 
(2006) studied Rock the Vote GOTV ads and found them to be effective, while Krasno and 
Green (2006), on the other hand, found that campaign ads –positive or negative –had no 
significant impact on turning out the youth vote in the final weeks of the election. 
Researchers such as Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar (1995) argue that these 
advertisements are effective and contain information useful in decision making. However, 
others such as Basil et al (1991) argue that negative advertising is counterproductive in that it 
has the effect of having the message heard but could have harmful effects on the candidate. 
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The effort to fortify the youth vote has led to a large market of nonpartisan issue 
groups. These programs have been sorted into five rough categories by Shea and Green 
(2007): the entertainment industry, with projects such as Rock the Vote; foundation funded 
initiatives, such as New Voters Project; liberal interest groups, such as New Voter Alliance 
and America Coming Together; those involved in new technology or an institution such as 
Harvard Institute of Politics; and those programs directly associated with major political 
parties such as Young Democrats of America. In 2004, several groups, such as Declare 
Yourself and Rock the Vote, spent more than 40 million dollars in promoting a coordinated 
message (Walker 2006). Privately funded 527 organizations, such as The Young Voters 
Alliance and College Democrats formed in 2004 to focus solely on turning out the vote of 
likeminded youth. In addition, both the Democratic National Committee and the Republican 
National Committee had youth outreach directors and written youth outreach plans (Walker 
2006). Further, specific outreach was done for traditionally low-turnout groups through voter 
registration drives, including youth voters. As Thomas Patterson points out in The Vanishing 
Voter (2002), simplified registration works to the advantage of those with less income and 
education. These are the voters who typically vote less, but by registering these voters, they 
are more easily contacted because their information is available through Secretary of States’ 
offices. 
While field studies and research have helped campaigns and candidates reach out to 
young people more effectively, there are still several barriers to successful mobilization. 
Because voter registration and voting history is available, it allows campaigns to focus and 
micro target the people they think are most likely to vote. As young people have traditionally 
voted less, they are not considered the traditional voters or “base” for either party. Young 
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people are also more transient, have unlisted cell phone numbers, and are hard to reach 
during traditional evening calling hours. This can lead to a mobilization bias toward older 
voters (Ware 1985).  
This micro-targeting theory is confirmed by Rosenstone’s (1993) study of the decline 
in voter turnout in presidential election years between the 1960s and 1980s. He reviewed a 
potential list of causes for declining voter turnout and pointed out that in the 1980s, even 
though individuals had a higher level of education and were less likely to encounter 
legislative barriers, a large part of the decrease in turnout was because strategic electoral 
mobilization declined. The 1960s saw political parties mobilizing at least 25% of the 
electorate, whereas the 1980s saw political parties shifting to paid media strategies and 
mobilizing fewer voters through grassroots door-to-door techniques. In his 1942 book, Party 
Government, E. E. Schattschneider talks about the critical positive relationship between local 
party or intermediary organizations and high levels of political participation. However, using 
a survey of local party leaders across the country, Shea and Green (2007) identify that while 
many leaders see youth outreach as important, less than half were actively involved or gave 
priority to mobilizing youth voters. They point out two reasons for the decrease in voter 
mobilization from local parties: local parties are weaker and less funded and local parties 
have seen a change in purpose and focus.  
Moreover, Strachan (2007) identifies a failure on the part of the local political parties 
to play a more substantial role in citizenship education as opposed to just serving as the seller 
of candidates and winner of electoral activities. Almost one -half of local party leaders said 
youth were very difficult to mobilize, while as many said youth were somewhat difficult to 
mobilize. In addition, David Nickerson (2002) points out that youth are roughly three times 
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more difficult to contact than older voters as seen in six voter mobilization field experiments. 
Nickerson’s data also shows that the parties gave lower priority to mobilizing youth 
compared to seniors. Yet, there is a great deal of evidence that mobilization by political 
parties increases voter turnout in national, state, and local elections (Strachan 2007). In 
research that documents county party outreach to youth voters collected by Green and Shea 
(2007), the conclusions drawn from the successful experiment have led many political 
organizations to recognize the electoral possibilities if they make youth a priority. 
There are critics who believe that a decrease in party mobilization techniques is not 
the reason for decreased turnout, but instead, that a change in the quality of the contacts with 
the use of impersonal techniques is to blame (Goldstein and Ridout 2008). Putnam (2000) 
confirms that in-person mobilization techniques are more effective than phone contacts. But 
making youth voters a priority may require some changes in traditional strategies because 
young people tend to rely on a variety of resources to obtain information beyond traditional 
sources. The 18 -24 age group is more likely to turn to alternative media sources such as the 
Internet and comedy television shows for their news than past generations (Kaiser Report 
2004). This trend is confirmed by the Harvard IOP study in Spring 2008 which showed that 
36% of young people age 18 -24 turn to cable television for news while 26% turn to the 
Internet. These techniques require a shift in the traditional approach by candidates and 
campaigns alike.  
Based on prior research, a strong case can be made for youth voter outreach 
techniques that are specific to that voting bloc. The increase in youth voter turnout in the 
Iowa caucuses provides an opportunity to review a case study with the hopes of identifying 
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best practices and themes for future research. The next section provides the overarching 
premise and research questions to be analyzed. 
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Chapter 3.  Proposition and Research Questions 
The underlying proposition of this project is that youth voter mobilization techniques 
increased youth voter turnout in the 2008 Iowa Democratic caucuses. Specifically, three 
research tested approaches; peer-to-peer contact, voter training, and candidate/campaign 
direct request for support -were utilized by campaigns and interest groups and resulted in 
increased turnout among youth voters. 
 Field experiments and campaign research on voting confirm that friends and peers 
play an instrumental role in individual voting decisions and behavior. In 2008, the 
Democratic campaigns in the Iowa caucuses sought to capitalize on two things that were 
quite important to young people: social networking and receiving information through a 
technology medium that is an ingrained part of their culture. As a result of these two focal 
points, campaign and candidate events and the caucuses were promoted as social, fun events 
where young people could fulfill their civic duty and support a candidate who best embodied 
their message. In 2008, it appears that Democratic campaigns effectively identified a youth-
centric medium and used technology to communicate, organize, and set goals for youth 
voters.  
While some individuals had learned from their parents about the caucus process, 
many others were not informed on how the caucus process worked. Based on commonly 
used political consultant knowledge, campaigns and civic groups organized hands-on voter 
training for potential caucus attendees that was accessible and available. The key concepts of 
the training were the same for young and old voters alike, however, the medium was often 
different. On one end of the spectrum, a citizen could receive their information through text 
 31
messages and You Tube or on the other end of the spectrum, they could be trained over the 
phone or in person. 
 While extrinsic techniques such as peer-to-peer contact and voter training get 
individuals to the polls, equally as important when studying youth voter turnout is the 
intrinsic motivation of why they voted. The conundrum of why people vote must recognize 
that there are multiple factors which influence a persons’ decision to vote.  
Prior research states two well-known ideas: 1) that young voters are not voting at the 
same rates as other eligible voters and 2) politicians do not view youth as a voting bloc that 
impacts their campaign strategy or public policymaking strategy. As a government teacher, I 
often have conversations with young people about the chicken and the egg in the case of 
circular cause and consequence. What would it take for young people to feel like they were 
being heard and for candidates to speak to young people in a way that was authentic, rich, 
and relevant? Will candidates have to reach out to young voters first, or will young voters 
turn out, grabbing the attention of candidates? What issues, messages and techniques did 
candidates and campaigns use to reach out to young voters and what did young voters do in 
response to the invitation? The Iowa caucuses and the nature of the competitive race 
demonstrate that candidates, some more than others, can successfully make the first move 
and reach out to the core, untapped constituency of young voters to seek support for their 
candidacy. As seen in the literature review, previous studies have shown that individuals tend 
to vote more when they are asked to participate than those who were not asked. Therefore, it 
seem likely that young people turned out in the 2008 Democratic caucuses because they were 
courted and invited, much like the rest of Iowa caucus-goers. 
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 From this assumption I can propose the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: Did peer-to-peer contact and social networking opportunities 
increased youth attendance at the Iowa caucuses. The campaign and the caucus process 
provided an opportunity for friends to talk to friends and coworkers to talk to coworkers -
both in person and online. Many of the political events and the caucuses itself were promoted 
with the allure of being “the” thing to do. 
 
Research Question 2: Did voter training made the caucus process seem simple and 
accessible? The effort to prepare first-time caucus attendees for what they would encounter 
demystified the process and made the caucus process seem quite easy and painless. In 2008, 
it seems likely that caucus training improved internal political efficacy and increased turnout 
in the Iowa caucuses.   
 
Research Question 3: Did young voters attend the 2008 Iowa caucuses because they were 
asked and felt wanted? The electoral process has often ignored young voters based on their 
electoral performance rate. A two-way street was created when politicians reached out to 
young people and in return young people listened and got involved. Young people are aware 
that politicians have in the past ignored them and as a result were quite receptive to 
candidates that directly solicited their support. 
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Chapter 4.  Data and Methodology 
Data 
 This research seeks to understand why youth voter turnout increased in the 2008 Iowa 
Democratic caucuses. A total of 65,230 Iowans under the age of 30 participated in the 2008 
Iowa caucuses. Within that universe, 52,580 young people participated in the Democratic 
caucuses (CIRCLE 2008).   
My goal in this research process was to use qualitative methods including a focus 
group, individual interviews, public information, and journalistic reports to understand how 
youth voters came to their decision to attend and participate in Iowa’s 2008 Democratic 
precinct caucuses. Therefore, in assessing the overall voter participation data, the decision 
was made to look solely at Democratic caucus-goers. This decision was based on three 
important criteria. First, the 2008 Democratic caucus saw a threefold increase in youth 
participation. This year, 52,580 youth participated in the Democratic caucuses while only 
12,650 participated in the Republican caucuses. Second, the unique characteristics of the 
Democratic presidential field seemed to call a great deal off attention to the historic nature of 
the field. Third, according to electoral results and voter registration numbers, Iowa is 
trending Democratic.  
After the record-breaking turnout at the Iowa caucuses, the Democratic Party has 
amassed a voter registration advantage that has grown to more than 90,000 in Iowa…. 
It's been a relatively quick shift from Republican dominance in Iowa to one where 
Democrats hold a majority of congressional seats, the governor's office and both 
chambers of the Iowa Legislature (Charlotte Eby, Waterloo Cedar Falls Courier, July 
2008). 
 
Accordingly, the dependent variable in this study was youth voter turnout in the 2008 
Iowa Democratic caucuses. Information and voter records about the dependent variable can 
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be retrieved for replication through the Iowa Democratic Party, which has the official 
attendance records for the Iowa caucuses. In addition, new voter registrations were verified 
and processed by the Iowa Secretary of State’s Office and are part of a public database. 
There are three independent variables that may have induced or explained the increase in 
voter turnout: peer-to-peer communication, voter training, and the request to an individual to 
participate in the political process. To operationalize these variables, each will be explained 
in terms that can be measured and defined. 
 The two primary ways that variables were operationalized were through focus group 
and individual interviews and, second, through themes identified and collected from survey 
information. Specific responses were identified that addressed each of the stated research 
questions. These discreet response units were then evaluated and categorized into dominant 
themes that helped provide a more descript picture of youth voters. To provide more 
background on specific voter mobilization techniques, individual candidate preferences, and 
information about the caucus-goer, each individual was asked to fill out a survey. This 
information, while not a large enough sample for generalization, allowed for a more thorough 
and systematic analysis of individual voter mobilization techniques (See Appendix D).  
Peer-to-peer contact, young people talking to other young people, was defined as 
face-to-face conversations about a political candidate, email exchanges that included 
involvement or persuasion. This technique, used by campaigns and interest groups to invite 
voters into the political process and persuade for their candidate, took many formats: 
Facebook profiles that showed candidate preference, peer-to-peer phone calls, text messages, 
emails, and conversations. Voter training is defined as the process of informing a person 
about how the caucus worked and where and how to attend a caucus. Individuals were 
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trained through a variety of mechanisms including watching a video, attending an in-person 
training, reading a brochure, or receiving an explanation over the phone or through email. 
The individual ask will be defined by looking at individual perceptions of candidate asks as 
well as resources allocated to this task.  
It was critical to unpack “Democratic youth voters” by studying the behavior and 
attitudes of high school students, college students, and young professionals. Together, this 
group of voters encompasses 17.5 to 29 year-olds who participated in the Democratic 
precinct caucuses in Iowa in 2008. In recognizing that these groups were at three different 
stations in life, the hope was that any trends or nuances that were unique to one group could 
be identified. A focus group was assembled to target this demographic in addition to doing 
interviews and surveys with young leaders, campaign organizations, campus coordinators, 
and those active in high school. For the focus group and interviews, there was no reward for 
participation except for pizza or snacks.  
In order to identify a pool of young Democratic caucus-goers, I contacted youth 
delegates and participants in attendance at the Iowa Democratic State Convention and invited 
them to participate in a focus group. I contacted them in advance through email and word of 
mouth and handed out flyers the morning of the convention. The focus group was open to 
anyone from the ages of 17.5 – 29 who had participated in the Democratic caucuses. The 
general limitations of the focus group were that individuals who take the time to attend a 
Democratic state convention tend to be the most active, and indeed a bulk of my focus group 
included leaders in the youth community. There were very few “typical caucus-goers.” 
However, this research remedies another problem. Past research has focused a great deal of 
effort on college students, seemingly to the detriment of high school students and young 
 36
professionals. Therefore, the results here aim to provide a more descript picture of an average 
youth voter as opposed to an average college voter.  
This project used findings from a focus group investigation that sought to understand 
young voters’ attitudes and reasons for participating in the Iowa caucuses. A facilitator guide 
was used for the group, using moderator discretion to poke and probe in different directions 
depending on the comments of the group (See Appendix A). The focus group participants 
ranged in age from 17.5 to 29, with a heavy emphasis on high school and college students. 
There were 5 high school students, 8 college students and 3 young professionals. Of that 
group, there were 9 Barack Obama supporters, 4 John Edwards’ supporters and 3 Hillary 
Clinton supporters. The individuals represented all four corners of Iowa, including rural and 
urban communities. Several of the participants had come to the convention with their parents, 
who were activists in the Democratic Party, while others attended on their own or with a 
friend. Of the high school and college participants, many were currently involved in some 
type of political student group. 
The second aspect of the project included 15 interviews with campaign leadership, 
campaign campus coordinators, youth and interest group leaders to learn more about the 
types of outreach they employed and their effectiveness. In order to get information from a 
cross section of campaigns, individuals who held a leadership position in all presidential 
campaigns or someone they recommended were contacted. I was successful in securing 
interviews with the Clinton, Edwards, and Obama campaigns. The designated youth 
coordinator for each campaign, either by title or job description, and each campaign’s Iowa 
State University campus coordinators were interviewed. I completed 3 interviews with the 
Clinton campaign, 4 interviews with the Obama campaign and 2 interviews with the Edwards 
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campaign. It was very interesting to speak with the presidential candidates’ designated youth 
representatives who worked in the Des Moines campaign headquarters and compare their 
strategy and outreach to the actual on-the-ground process as described by the presidential 
candidate campus coordinators. The interviews represented a very good blend of theory and 
reality (See Appendix B).  
By most accounts in individual interviews, there were very few interest groups that 
played as active a role in recruiting youth voters as the presidential campaigns. Rock the 
Vote, the ONE campaign, Iowans for Sensible Priorities, and Save Darfur were all 
individually mentioned by youth as organizations they had seen at one time or another during 
the presidential campaign in their classrooms or at Democratic functions. The one group that 
was specifically mentioned numerous times for doing targeted outreach on college campuses 
was Iowa PIRG. Representatives of all five of these organizations were interviewed in 
addition to the staff at the Iowa Democratic Party who could speak to what, if any, 
involvement or perspective they had on youth voter turnout. With the exception of Iowans 
for Sensible Priorities, who endorsed Senator Edwards, all of the interest groups were neutral 
and did not endorse a candidate. In terms of limitations of my interviews, it was difficult to 
identify any willing or relevant individuals who could speak on behalf of the Dodd, Biden, 
and Richardson campaigns. As they were second tier candidates, the limitation is unlikely to 
skew the information gathered; however, those campaigns may have used a particular 
technique worth noting that will not be mentioned here. 
In addition to the qualitative research gathered, thanks to the efforts of Iowa State 
University’s departments of political science and statistics, quantitative data was gathered in 
a 2007-2008 pre/post caucus poll. The Iowa State University Pre/Post Caucus 2008 Poll was 
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not done in conjunction with this thesis, yet there are certain questions that provide support 
or information for my research. 695 Iowa State University and University of Iowa students 
were polled and from that, 265 attendees who had caucused in the 2008 Iowa caucuses 
provide data to offer a richer description of Iowa’s college caucus attendees (See Appendix 
C). There are several questions identified that provide context for the research. The questions 
cover topics such as where students chose to caucus, either in their college town or another 
location. The survey sought to identify the role that friends’ and neighbors’ support of a 
candidate and their persuasion efforts had on individual choice. The survey asked 
respondents to identify the most important issue in their decision to support a candidate, and 
asked students to select the characteristic that was most important to them in a candidate, 
such as personal integrity, experience, electability, or position on the issues. The last relevant 
question asked the respondent to describe themselves on a political spectrum from liberal to 
conservative.  
 
Methodology 
This project utilizes a qualitative approach that relies primarily on quotes, comments, 
and stories to provide evidence and support for arguments. This case study was an 
observation of three unique age groups at a single point in time, following the Iowa caucuses. 
The interviews involved retrospection where participants were asked to report their thoughts 
and cognitive process after the event.  
The use of a focus group provided for rich peer-to-peer interaction and prompting, 
which might not have otherwise been provided in individual interviews or survey data. The 
free flowing discussion allowed for opportunities to disagree, reflect, and suggest additional 
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ideas that had not been already suggested. The information collected helps provide context 
and emotions and immeasurable themes to be evaluated in the decision making process that 
might be missed in quantitative data studies.  
Interviews have specific advantages over survey research. Most notably, interviews 
confirm information and accuracy collected from other sources. These interactions allow for 
cross checking as well as identification of any weaknesses in particular sources. Additionally, 
they identify additional participants, stories, or documents that can enhance the case study. 
George and Bennett’s (2005) method of process tracing is used to analyze this 
qualitative data, as detailed in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
In process tracing, “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview 
transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in 
that case” (6). Using this process helps reduce the vast number of variables to a more 
manageable number.  This methodology allows for a focus on the causal mechanisms that 
link causes to effects and helps generate and analyze data central to the issue. George and 
Bennett define causal mechanisms as “ultimately unobservable physical, social, or 
psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific 
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (2005: 137). 
Using the framework of George and Bennett (2005), the diagram adopts process 
induction, which allows for observation of apparent causal mechanisms as potential 
hypotheses for future testing. Figure 1 will allow us to explain the decision process and 
identify how youth voters at Point A got to Point B where whey were participating in record 
numbers in the Iowa caucuses. To begin, we look at processes, events, actions, and other 
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intervening variables that may have impacted the causal dependent variable. This diagram 
provides a basic frame for process induction to take place. Using process induction to explain 
the decision process, the following sequence took place. First, the variables which impacted 
the dependent variable were identified and studied. Second, the behavior that occurred was 
recorded. Third, the effects of particular variables were assessed with an attempt to explain 
their explanatory power.    
 
Figure 1. Voter Decision Making Process 
 
 
 
 
VOTING THEORIES   
 ACTIONS, PROCESSES 
    EVENTS   
OTHER INTERVENING VARIABLES 
 
  
YOUTH VOTER AGE 17.5 - 29 
YOUTH VOTER TURNOUT 
2008 DEMOCRATIC CAUCUSES 
 
 
   
         
It is important to use the foundation of voting behavior theories to take into account 
certain things we already know about the electorate. George and Bennett (1997) state, “Even 
theories for which no process tracing evidence is accessible must be considered in the 
analysis of a case if there are reasons to believe that they are relevant” 
(http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/~kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm). Each theory 
brings its own set of predictions. In identifying the theories prior to determining causation, it 
will be helpful in distinguishing variables that result in covariation as opposed to causality 
between the dependent and independent variables. 
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 Figure 2 provides a visual frame to identify the causal elements which impact the 
decision making process. There are certain things we know about voting behavior from 
theories highlighted in the literature review. Namely, political socialization influences 
political attitudes, ideology, and participation. In the case of the youth voter, parental 
attitudes on participation might heavily influence the decision to participate. In terms of 
demographic factors such as socioeconomic status, age, and geography, we know that low 
socioeconomic status, young age, and location of residence all directly impact the likelihood 
of voting. 
 Next, a review of the events, actions, processes, and other intervening variables that 
might have caused youth voter turnout to increase in the 2008 Iowa Democratic caucuses is 
provided. There are many events going on in the world around us that impacted how people 
perceived the presidential primary process. With regards to events, the highly competitive 
open seat presidential election, our country at war, the media hype of the Iowa first-in-the- 
nation caucuses, and a strong Democratic field of candidates with the potential to make 
history provide the foundation for increased voter interest. Next, actions such as highly active 
presidential campaigns and interest groups specifically targeting youth voter turnout may 
have provided focused resources to lead to higher youth voter turnout. Targeted actions such 
as peer-to-peer contact, voter training, and candidate ask communicated the message directly 
to voters. As a result of events and actions, mainstream media attention focused on 
presidential campaigns and was a common discussion thread in high schools, college 
campuses, and dinner tables throughout Iowa. Lastly, it is important to take into account 
emerging research that portrays the Millennial Generation as more politically aware and 
active than previous generations. 
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 Using a case study approach focusing on process induction, and the list of potential 
variables (theory, events, actions, process, intervening variables) that may have increased 
voter turnout, the statements and surveys allowed me to make inferences about variables 
which seemed more central to the outcome of the dependent variable.  
 In summary, while the case study method has its shortcomings, such as its inability to 
observe individuals prior to the activity and its inability to control for certain intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors, it identifies information and findings that would often be ignored because of 
research design problems. This research recognizes the potential of qualitative data while 
also allowing for a relevant, yet limited, amount of supporting data which provides a richer, 
quantitative view of college caucus attendees. 
The next section of this thesis provides a comprehensive report of the focus group 
with individuals age 17.5 – 29 as well as individual interviews with youth activists. It begins 
with a brief overview of the caucus process and how it differentiates itself from voting. Next, 
a brief snapshot of each segment of youth voters is provided. Included in the youth voter 
subheadings are topics that the investigator brought up specifically with youth voters to 
include: Why youth voter turnout increased, issues of importance to youth, mobilization 
techniques that worked such as peer-to-peer contact and voter training, why the caucuses 
were perceived as “the event,” and lastly, why youth voters caucused for a particular 
candidate. 
The story then broadens by pulling in conversations with key Iowa staff and interest 
groups involved in youth outreach to learn about the programs that they wrote and 
implemented. The campaign subheadings add the description of the strategic decisions and 
resource allocations made by campaigns, the youth voter mobilization techniques that they 
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implemented and viewed successful, how they allotted candidate time as it relates to youth 
outreach and their candidate’s image and appeal to youth.  
Following the campaign section, interest groups are provided an opportunity to 
discuss their role in youth voter turnout in Iowa. The discussion of all of these topics 
provides the background necessary for a discussion and analysis of the research questions 
presented. 
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Chapter 5.  Results 
In coffee shops and classrooms, through emails and cell phones, young people in 
Iowa assisted in telling the story of Democratic youth participation in the 2008 Iowa 
caucuses. In 2004 an estimated 20,740 young people showed up to the Iowa caucuses as 
opposed to 2008, when it is estimated that 52,580 young individuals showed up to caucus 
(CIRCLE 2008). To understand the significance of this number, it is important to highlight 
the distinction between voting and caucusing, as the caucus commitment is greater in 
duration and more intricate in process.  
On Thursday, January 3, 2008 at 7:00 p.m., depending on which of the 1,784 precinct 
locations you attended, a caucus-goer engaged with tens, hundreds, or thousands of 
individuals all seeking to be involved in the selection of the Democratic presidential 
nominee. In many cases, there were long lines and confusion, limited seating, and overheated 
rooms. The process lasted at least one hour, but the average time commitment in 2008 was 
2.5 hours (Iowa Democratic Party, 2008). The commitment to caucus by an individual was a 
political act unlike a 15-minute visit to the voting booth, and this research seeks to identify 
the underlying motives that sent young people to the caucuses in large numbers. 
This story begins by looking at a snapshot of voter eligibility of Iowa high school and 
college students and young professionals. Next, general observations are provided by youth 
about why youth voter participation increased. Third, a focus on issues and the roles that 
partisan/non partisan messages played in the individual decision making process are 
discussed. This inquiry then discusses individual outreach techniques such as peer-to-peer 
contact and caucus training. Then, an in-depth look at individual rationale for supporting 
particular candidates is provided.  
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The format begins with observations from youth voters, then campaign professionals 
and volunteers, then interest groups. Throughout many sections, “high school students,” 
“college students,” and “young professionals” are differentiated and their viewpoints are 
recognized as unique to their station in life. At other points, the commonalities of the three 
groups are combined under the description “young/youth voters.” 
 
Youth Voters: A Profile of High School Students, College Students and Young Professionals 
In acknowledging that youth ages 17.5 to 29 are in very different phases of their life 
during that 12 year period of time, campaigns sought out opportunities to find young people 
in their institutional or social settings. I begin with a snapshot of these young voters as it 
relates to their eligibility and participation in the caucuses. 
Based on Iowa’s voting rules, any citizen who will be 18 by Election Day, November 
4, 2008, was eligible to participate in the Iowa caucuses. This provision typically makes 
some portion of high school seniors eligible to participate in the Iowa caucuses. While 
challenged with the competing demands of sporting events, music, practices, and other 
extracurricular activities, there were different levels of campaign and interest group outreach 
to Iowa high school students across the state. There are 357 high schools in Iowa, providing 
an excellent opportunity to identify new caucus-goers for the 1,784 precinct caucuses around 
the state.  
Unlike high school students, who are grounded in their home location and high 
school, college students by their very nature are transient individuals, typically residing in 
their college town for nine months and home town for three months. In Iowa, college 
students are often the focus of pundit speculation every four years when the Democratic and 
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Republican National Committees go through a series of meetings where they discuss the 
presidential nominating calendar. When the date and time are set, pundits and campaigns 
alike enjoy analyzing which campaigns stand to gain or lose support based on the date of the 
caucuses. When the date of Thursday, January 3, 2008 was set for the Iowa caucuses, one of 
the first assessments made were that college communities and their student residents were the 
big losers since a bulk of the colleges and universities would not be in session, when it is 
logically easier to mobilize students.  
As a result, one of the common questions that college students often asked about was 
the location of their precinct caucus. College students who reside in Iowa have the choice of 
registering to vote at their campus address or home address. Campaigns made an extra push 
to obtain students’ college and home addresses so they could reach them during their winter 
break from school.  
College students, most notably out-of-state college students, often face barriers—real 
or perceived—in voter registration. Specifically in Iowa during the 2008 caucuses, 
Democratic presidential campaigns were involved in a tense discussion about what type of 
college student could participate in the Iowa caucuses. The debate centered on whether or not 
an out-of-state student who attended an Iowa college and therefore lived in Iowa nine months 
out of the year was considered an eligible caucus-goer. While it is indeed legal, there was a 
discussion in The Nation about whether or not it was “fair” or “right” (Connery, 2007). This 
ongoing conversation caused a great deal of confusion among young people about who could 
caucus and whether they were eligible to caucus. During the debate over participation and 
eligibility, Iowa PIRG, Rock the Vote, and College Democrats joined together to make clear 
their viewpoint that Iowa college students should be allowed to participate: 
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It has recently come to our attention that some presidential candidates are 
suggesting that students in Iowa should not caucus. We’re shocked that any 
national figure would advocate for youth disenfranchisement. This goes 
against the very grain of our democracy and the core values of our nation. We 
live here in Iowa for the majority of the year and make our homes here; we are 
active participants in our communities—volunteering, giving back, and 
contributing intellectual and financial resources to the state. To say that 
students who didn't grow up in Iowa, but who now live here, shouldn’t have 
the choice to participate in the caucuses is blatant voter disenfranchisement 
(Statement in Support of Full Voting Rights for Iowa Youth 2007). 
 
It is also important to note that the overall registration gains of The Motor Voter Act 
has helped liberalize voter registration laws in Iowa and nationally over the past several 
years. Access to information from the Iowa Secretary of State and Iowa Democratic Party 
has made it easier for campaigns to integrate voter registration information into mobilization 
efforts. 
Finally, we turn to “young professionals,” individuals aged 22 to 29. These are 
individuals who may be dealing with their first “real” job, first home purchase, first car 
purchase along with marriage and potentially a family. As a whole, this group is pulled in 
multiple directions by work obligations, social commitments and family responsibilities 
which often cause conflicts to their participation.  
In addition to the criticism of the voter eligibility aspect of the caucuses, the caucus 
process has long been argued as undemocratic as it discriminates against working individuals 
and families. In not allowing a proxy vote or absentee balloting when someone is unable to 
attend, it limits individual participation. The caucuses are held in the evening, which can 
prohibit the participation of people who work at night and people with children who have no 
childcare available or cannot afford childcare. Most recently, Senator Clinton expressed her 
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disappointment with the caucus system with repeated criticism that it is undemocratic and 
caters mostly to party activists (Fouhy, 2008).  
 
Youth Voters: Why Turnout Increased 
While there were barriers to participating in the caucuses, we know that Democratic 
youth voter turnout increased. The fact that the 2008 election had the potential to produce the 
first woman, first African-American or first Latino president made the election more 
noteworthy and significant to the media and general population. It also seemed to appeal to a 
larger pool of multicultural voters –young and old. In addition to the other firsts, for many 
young people, 2008 was the first open-seat election in which they were eligible to vote. The 
stakes of the election, in large part due to the media coverage and campaign rhetoric, seemed 
higher for young people, who for most of their adult life have known our country to be at war 
and encountering increasing budget deficits and a slide toward a recession. In reviewing the 
assessments of why young people believe voter turnout increased, there was general 
consensus among all groups that the media attention, the war in Iraq, and the open seat 
election caused a great deal of conversation about who will serve as the next president. 
However, many young people did not find the historic nature of the candidates -in terms of 
race or gender -to be all that the pundits made of it. Many suggested that they were born in an 
era where women were doctors and could run for president and where young people are color 
blind in a way that previous generations were not. 
In her interview, one female young professional activist added that while race and 
gender did not impact who she supported: 
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For some people who feel more marginalized by politics, they saw either a 
woman or a person of color who has also traditionally been marginalized in 
politics. And I think they were able to relate to that and see that “hey, if a 
woman might be elected president, or if an African American can be elected 
president, maybe my vote counts. So, I think that people who have not been 
traditionally interested in politics saw a face of someone unexpected and 
maybe that at least helped them get a little more involved. 
 
Another female young professional activist in an interview stated: 
I think the nature of the field energized a lot of people too. Even if they 
weren’t supporting one of the ‘first’ candidates, you know, they saw that at 
least the Democratic Party had an open vision of what could be. 
 
Others acknowledged the fact the caucuses were perceived as “the event” of sorts, as 
one female high school student leader responded, “Many of my friends were all going 
together. It was a reason to be social and to get out of the house and do something together.” 
A Clinton campus organizer stated about the caucuses, “you couldn’t avoid it, you couldn’t 
miss it -there was a countdown clock on the television screens and constant live coverage.” 
In fact, some young voters were puzzled by the fuss made over increased youth voter 
turnout in 2008. For example, in the focus group a male college student responded with 
surprise when I brought up the historic nature of youth voter turnout:  
I was brought up in a family and school system to care and to participate. I am 
sure there are still a lot of young people who don’t participate, but I know that 
many of my friends and the people I hang out with are volunteering and 
voting. 
 
 
Youth Voters: Issues of Importance 
The focus group discussion spent time talking about the issue positions and 
characteristics that individuals were looking for in a president. The hype around the caucuses 
provided for more forums and avenues to learn about presidential candidate issue positions. 
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The national debate in Iowa tended to focus on three major issues: the war in Iraq and foreign 
policy as a whole, how to implement affordable health care, and the concepts of experience 
and change. In terms of issues, high school students and college students tended to identify 
themselves more with specific “youth issues” such as the environment and college debt while 
young professionals found the issues they cared about quite similar with mainstream voters 
above 30.  
 In interviewing a high school student leader whether or not there are “youth issues,” 
he responded,  
I think so. There are issues that affect young people although they don’t 
realize it. Things like social security and the national debt would be examples. 
But there are also issues that youth find immediately important: the war, 
voting rights, Pell Grants. 
 
In the survey data, high school students identified the war and reform/change of 
system as the reasons they most supported the candidate that they did. 
College students identified reform/change of system as their primary policy of 
importance with the war second. The Iowa State University poll data paints a slightly 
different picture of college students: 19% of college respondents identified the Iraq War as 
the most important issue, while 18% of the respondents said they cared most about a 
combination of issues such as the war, health care, the economy, and social issues. The ISU 
Poll of college students who participated in the Democratic caucus stands in stark contrast 
with 31% of Republican college caucus-goers who placed economic issues and 23% who 
cited social issues such as abortion and same sex marriage as key issues in their decision to 
support a candidate.  
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In ranking presidential characteristics, 37% of Democratic college caucus attendees 
said that the candidate positions on issues was most important, 35% said personal integrity 
was important, with 10% identifying experience as their most important characteristic in a 
president. It is interesting to note that anecdotally Senator Clinton seemed to campaign as the 
“experience” candidate and Senator Obama campaigned as the “change candidate.” The 10% 
of college students who see experience as the most important characteristic do not seem to 
match up with the overwhelming support that Senator Clinton received in the ISU Poll and 
those ideas seem to contradict each other. 
 Young professionals overwhelmingly identified reform/change of system as the 
policy they associated most with their candidate. In the summer of 2007, an Iowa poll 
showed that respondents overwhelmingly wanted “someone who is more likely to change 
things in Washington” and “someone who will reduce the influence of lobbyists and special 
interests” and that candidate was Senator Obama with 49% of eligible voters polled (Real 
Clear Politics 2007). In addition, 46% of the people under thirty polled (Real Clear Politics 
2007) stated that they were most likely to vote for Senator Obama. However, the picture is 
not exactly clear on what young voters want to hear. During an interview, two young 
professional activists discuss “youth issues:”   
Female:  I don’t think there are youth issues. I don’t think there are 
women’s issues.  There are people’s issues.  It’s the same. We 
cared about the same things that older voters did, but it was…I 
think it was us paying attention to it for the first time.  Or a 
larger body of people paying attention to those issues for the 
first time.  And maybe the perspective is a little different.  Um, 
because it’s our friends that are fighting in Iraq.  They are our 
age.  But, it’s the same issues. 
Female:  Because I think of the 1960s when our parents were involved.  
I just remember their activism was around a war. 
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Male:  Take the war out the picture this time around, which is tough to 
do, but take it out. And what’s going to draw you to vote vs. 
what draws you to vote vs. what draws you to vote? There’s 
isn’t…there doesn’t seem…in talking to people I know, any… 
there doesn’t seem to be any coalescing issue that draws a 
young person out to vote.  Because I’m not worried about the 
retirement… or the Social Security check in the mail two years 
from now. I mean, if you talked to high school students, Social 
Security is gone. They’re not worried about it.  It’s just not 
there. 
Female:  So you are saying, like, there’s no cohesive issue besides the 
war? 
Same male:  Yeah. 
Same female:  I would probably agree with that.  
  
The young voters discussed in this section mirror The Washington Post entrance poll 
data in Iowa, which portrayed 17-29 year olds as divided among the top three issues with 
34% stating the economy as most important, 33% stating health care as most important, and 
32% stating the war in Iraq as most important. In the entrance poll data, nearly three-quarters 
(73 %) of 17-29 year olds ideologically describe themselves as liberal (including 29% very 
liberal) while 20% of the respondents consider themselves moderate (Agiesta and Cohen, 
2008). The ISU Poll of college students provides substantiation of the entrance poll data in 
highlighting that 74% of Democratic college caucus-goers considered themselves as 
somewhat liberal (including 28% very liberal). In The Washington Post exit poll data, 26% of 
18-29 year olds considered themselves independent and not identifying with a political party. 
At face value, this information seems to contradict the information from the Harvard Institute 
of Politics that most young people (age 17.5 – 29) tend to identify themselves as a moderate 
and middle of the road. However, the logical explanation is that those who caucus tend to be 
to be more active and more liberal than general youth voters. 
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Youth Voters: Mobilization Techniques That Worked 
Ideological information about individual caucus-goers is important as it helps set the 
tone and message for mobilization techniques used by campaigns. As noted in the literature 
review, there is not clarity on whether a partisan or non partisan message works best. 
However, young people seem to be attracted to less partisan rhetoric in their comments. What 
is clear from my discussions is that campaigns and candidates identified and implemented 
certain youth voter mobilization techniques. Many participants found it hard to recall the 
specifics of the outreach techniques they experienced; instead, techniques seemed to blend 
together, causing this “perfect storm” of information about a candidate. However, there were 
some very clear “winners” and “losers” in terms of effectiveness, even if any one technique 
did not single handedly convince young people to vote.  
The most commonly used outreach technique was email encouraging someone to read 
an article, visit a website, watch a video, or make a donation. Receivers of the messages were 
clear to point out that while they skimmed all of them, they often only read the ones from 
someone they knew or that they had signed up to receive. In addition, all of the focus group 
participants had visited a candidate web page and highlighted certain features they especially 
remembered such as such the issues pages and the state specific homepages. One individual 
specifically mentioned the Obama website, which gave points for every individual activity 
and action. For instance, if you send an article to someone or make a phone call or donate 
money, you would receive points. The points are tallied and are publicly available to group 
members. They spoke with pride of the number of points they had earned. Almost all of the 
young professional and college students read political blogs, while high school students 
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tended not to read blogs. With the exception of two individuals, none of the participants did 
any individual blogging on candidate websites.  
Across the board, young people are online and their cell phone and computers are an 
essential part their daily life and means of communication. Most focus group participants 
were members of Facebook, My Space, or some other type of social networking site. One 
young professional leader stated in her interview, “between Facebook and Gmail, I would 
never leave my computer.” Campaigns reached out to individuals by asking them to join an 
internet based campaign group and put the candidate logo on their Facebook or My Space 
page. This discussion of Facebook explains the indirect branding effect that campaigns were 
all hoping to attain in social networking sites:  
I think…like we talked about Facebook groups, supporting someone. Having 
something like that where your friends see that you are supporting a candidate 
and that sort of put you out there as someone who has made this decision. 
You’re not throwing it in anyone’s face, but you’ve sort of sent a message that 
‘Hey, if you’re interested in talking about this, here’s where I am.’ 
 
It is important to note that campaigns used technology as one tool in the toolbox, yet 
still relied heavily on traditional outreach tactics. All participants enjoyed the door-to-door 
contact they received, although the contact was often not from a peer but instead a local 
volunteer, neighbor, or staff person. Most did not recall receiving any youth specific 
literature, but instead a general brochure with a biography of the candidate or issue positions 
on the candidate. Consistent with the research, all the participants thought automated “robo–
calls” were the most  ineffective and “annoying” ways to reach out to individuals. 
In addition to using technology and door-to-door canvasses, campaigns strategically 
used the candidate to reach out to a targeted population. One point that was made very clear 
by college students and young professionals is that they appreciated when candidates or 
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representatives came to them in their settings. One survey comment stated, “He [Obama] 
came to us.” “He [Obama] sent a representative to campus organization meetings for 
freshman and dorm meetings” said another. Similarly, one young professional highlighted 
that Michelle Obama met them in a bar to speak to a young professionals gathering, and 
another highlighted that Governor Richardson attended a Drinking Liberally function, which 
is an organization that describes itself as “an informal, inclusive progressive social group.” In 
a related question, when asked if a candidate specifically addressed why young people should 
caucus, all but one respondent said yes. Each individual felt like they had been asked to 
participate in the political process – through an invitation, an event, and when the campaigns 
reached out to them after the event to get them involved.  
One of the themes evident throughout this research is that young people want to be 
talked to, but also heard. Consequently, events where the candidate took questions resonated 
very well with young people. According to the group discussions, most candidates took 
questions while some candidates definitely seemed more accessible to questions. Individuals 
often looked at campaign staff and their ability to speak about the issues as a personal 
reflection of the candidate themselves. The expectation was that campaign workers were an 
extension of the candidate and therefore should be able to speak to their policy positions. As 
well, it was not uncommon that respondents highlighted the gender, age, or race of campaign 
staff in stating that they appreciated the message the campaign sent in having a diverse staff 
that represented the type of inclusiveness the campaigns hoped to achieve. A diverse staff 
also allowed for effective peer-to-peer outreach to take place by members of the staff in 
reaching out to the community. 
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Peer-to-Peer Contact 
The focus group discussion and interviews confirm that peer-to-peer contact makes a 
difference in prompting young people to attend the caucuses and support a candidate. The 
most effective contact seemed to be from a personal friend, while the second most effective 
contact seemed to be from an unknown peer –a high school student, college student, or 
young professional who was in the same “station in life.” All the respondents had 
participated in at least one conversation with friends about the process, and all but three 
participants tried to persuade someone else to support a candidate.  
This exchange between two young professionals in an interview highlights the 
significance of peer-to-peer contact and the role that it plays in choosing a candidate: 
Female A:  You want to talk about peer-to-peer.  Erin A. (Female B) 
played a big role in my consideration of another candidate.  I 
went into it in the very beginning of the process dead set on a 
specific candidate and then started to kind of sway a little, and 
I think Erin picked up on that, and without being intrusive or 
anything, she kind of put it out there: ‘If you want to talk, I’d 
love to have a conversation with you about this candidate.’  
And that kind of got the wheels turning and then I did my own 
research.  I thought for sure that I knew who I was supporting 
and then as the process played out because of a lot of, you 
know, peer-to-peer interaction, I ended up supporting someone 
else. 
 
Female B:   That’s how I made my decision, talking to friends who 
supported each of the candidates.  I think I heard all the 
candidates or met one-on-one with all the candidates because 
they are hanging out everywhere, so why not.  And then as I 
talked to my friends who were supporting them, I asked why.  
What were their top three reasons?  And I had talked to a lot of 
Obama people, so when I was talking to Erin F. it was more 
like ‘I have my reasons and I have a standard email I can send 
you,’ but it was more like ‘I’m here to tell you why, and if you 
want to listen, great.’  And that was about it. 
 
Additionally, one young professional male teacher in an interview stated: 
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I’m not out to evangelize. I got my candidate, and I really don’t care who you 
support. I guess I’m a libertarian in that respect. You have your reasons. If 
you come to me…if you’re asking questions, I’ll give you my reason, but I’m 
not out to convert the masses, I guess. 
 
 In the information collected, the peer influence in colleges did not seem as 
pronounced as it did with high school and young professionals. Since 90% of the college 
students caucused in their home location, it might have reduced the effects of peer-to-peer 
contact and interaction. According to the ISU Poll, in the very few Democratic caucuses 
where candidates were not viable, there did not seem to be any correlation between candidate 
choice and friends and neighbors influencing that decision. While almost all college 
respondents in the poll state that they knew someone at their caucus, it seems that there was a 
limited persuasion role amongst their friends and neighbors. 
   
Voter Training 
The campaigns did an excellent job identifying supporters. Clinton and Obama 
personnel stated that anywhere from 70 -85% of the Clinton and Obama supporters had not 
attended a caucus before. Training new voters was a critical component as voting and 
caucusing are extremely different. The goal of each training was to provide the caucus 
attendee with just enough information to know where to attend, a little about the process and 
time commitment, yet not too much information to be intimidated. Therefore, a great deal of 
resources were spent to train these supporters –the young and the old –on how to attend the 
upcoming caucuses. Individual respondents agreed that the campaigns did try to explain how 
the caucuses work – most notably through in person trainings, brochures, and videos.  
 59
Several high school students recalled learning about the caucus by reading a brochure 
given to them by a campaign, by hearing about it while they waited to hear a candidate 
speak, or through a discussion with a parent or teacher. Interestingly enough, the individuals 
admit that they had more favorable feelings for the campaigns that took the time to train them 
to caucus at an event. For instance, one student active in a high school political group stated 
in his interview: 
I want to be treated with respect and not like a number that’s just there to 
watch everything, but at the same time, I want to be, like, really pumped up 
and excited about what’s going on.  I want to be involved in what’s going on. 
I don’t just want to be treated like the spectator who came and doesn’t know 
anything. 
 
One of the things that stood out was how much young professionals enjoyed the 
“Caucus and Coronas” events where they learned about issues and the political process in a 
social setting. In their interview, two young professionals who were active in a civic youth 
group stated: 
Male:   I think if you want to stand at the front and learn all about the 
issue or maybe you want to stand towards the back and have a 
conversation. And nobody is judging you either way, and 
you’re having a beer and it’s very low key. And it doesn’t last 
very long. 
Female:   Yeah, I think that politics is just this completely…is this very 
foreign concept, and you think you have to be old and smart 
and wise to know what politics are, and my roommate was 
completely confused and almost, like, very intimidated. So 
they don’t even want to mess with it. But I think something 
like Caucus and Coronas or Drinking Liberally, when people 
are your age…it won’t be some old guy up in a suit explaining 
to you what politics are and make you feel stupid. That’s really 
the reason she didn’t like it…it made her feel dumb because 
she didn’t understand it. And I think when you can put into 
simplistic terms and have a beer while you’re doing it…or a 
martini or whatever…I think it’s very relaxed and it is not as 
intimidating as people think politics is. 
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A few young professionals interviewed had viewed an online training video: “I don’t 
know what this says about my friends and I, but we sat down and watched some of the web 
videos. I liked the Clinton training video. It was funny.” The video the participant was 
referring to used the tagline “Caucusing is Easy,” and compared it to other tasks such as 
dancing, exercising, and singing, which are hard. In each part, there was a different cameo by 
President Clinton, former Iowa Governor Tom and Christie Vilsack, and Senator Clinton. 
Other young professionals attended a mock caucus that had been put on by the Young 
Professionals Civic Committee in which they role played what would happen on caucus 
night. In the mock caucuses put on by campaigns and interest groups, attendees would 
pretend caucus for pizza, soda, candy, or a favorite rock band. One Ames college student 
recalled that she attended a “caucus of the bands” where all the attendees had to caucus for 
the band of their choice upon conclusion of the band performances, “I will always remember 
that because the group with the most fans in attendance won. The worst band won, but they 
had the most friends there.” 
 
Youth Voters: The Caucus Was “The Event” 
In the focus group, respondents talked about the caucuses as if it were “the thing to 
do.” According to focus group members, several social events took place prior to and after 
the caucuses. Based on the responses, slightly over half combined the caucuses with a social 
event of some sort. Some had dinner at a friend’s house ahead of time or dinner with their 
family, while others went to a candidate caucus night party and others still went straight 
home to bed after the caucuses. 
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A female young professional who was a leader in the youth community stated the 
following about a social event she attended on caucus night:  
I had friends who supported lots of different candidates, and we didn’t go to 
parties put on by the specific candidates. We went and had drinks afterwards 
and kind of decompressed and talked about what our experience had been 
because the caucuses were intimidating before you went but this year. This 
was a very intimidating caucus during the process because there were so many 
people and because of the large numbers there was a fair amount of 
disorganization, so going through what someone’s experience had been was 
helpful afterwards as well. 
 
The feeling that the Iowa caucuses were “the event” was perpetuated by school 
faculty and parents who played a role in encouraging students to attend the caucus. The 
teachers were not pushing a candidate, they were just encouraging students to attend. One 
male high school student in the focus group stated, “My mom went to her first caucus in 
1968 and she told me that. I went to the 2004 caucus and was an observer.” These comments 
illustrate how parents and teachers helped create a feeling that the caucuses were the “it” 
place to be. 
In an interesting twist, a college sorority adviser shared her comments about Senator 
Obama’s campaign on the Drake University campus:  
I’m really cautious to say this, because I don’t want to trivialize it or trivialize 
the youth vote because I don’t think this is it at all by any means.  But, I 
advise a college sorority, and it was amazing to watch…it’s a pretty 
conservative group of women…but it was fun to watch the sort of Obama 
wave float through that chapter house.  And I think a piece of it was, it 
became kind of the cool thing to do.  You could put it on your Facebook.  
There were cute T-shirts.  And suddenly it became hip to be involved in 
politics.  If you had a candidate, you supported them or went to their events. It 
became something really acceptable to do. 
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Youth Voters: I Caucused For…? 
While the intent of this project is to identify mobilization techniques that worked in 
mobilizing young voters, it is also clear that the candidate themselves played an important 
role in the individual caucusing decisions. According to Washington Post exit polls in Iowa, 
Senator Obama won 57% of support from voters age 17-29, followed next by Senator 
Clinton at 15% and Senator Edwards at 13% (Agiesta and Cohen, 2008). In many of the 
discussions with participants, they spoke with an air of emotion and excitement about their 
choice for president and each had their own personal reason unique to the others. 
In her interview, a female young professional leader explained why she supported 
Senator Obama in the following:  
It wasn’t just that campaigns were talking to young people; they were 
empowering them in positions of leadership within the campaign. I think that 
was something that spoke specifically to me. It wasn’t that they were only 
sending out young professionals to go knocking on doors; they were looking 
to them in advisory roles and really empowering them to be leaders within the 
campaign, not just sending them out to do the grunt work. And I think that 
that sent a very strong message that they were really genuinely interested in 
what young people were thinking. 
 
In a statement about his support for Senator Edwards, a male high school student from the 
focus group said, “Senator Edwards appealed to young people who are tired of the Bush 
Administration and really called for a change.” Another high school male in the focus group 
said, “Talk to me. Don’t spew talking points. I liked Joe Biden because he would discuss the 
issues with me like an adult and not just give catch phrases.” Furthermore, explaining her 
support of Senator Clinton, her volunteer campus coordinator said, “Personally, I just have 
liked her and have had a lot of respect for her, as a young woman interested in politics. She 
has always served as a role model to me.” 
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Based on the survey responses of focus group participants, Obama was the 
overwhelming first choice, followed in the single digits by Clinton and Edwards. This 
information closely mirrors The Washington Post exit poll data. Interestingly, the ISU poll of 
likely voters prior to the caucus predicted Senator Clinton (30.8 percent) ahead of John 
Edwards (24.4 percent) and more than 10 percentage points ahead of Barack Obama (20.2 
percent) in the Democratic race. At that point, nearly six percent of Democratic respondents 
don't know who their top choice will be. 
When focus group participants were asked why they believed Senator Obama most 
effectively reached out to young people, comments included: 
“He encouraged young people to caucus.” 
“He was the only one who made the case that young people should caucus. 
“Many other candidates tried to score points by discouraging out of state 
college participation.” 
“A lot of young people are optimistic that we can change the system, as 
opposed to gaming it affectively. Obama’s message spoke to young people for 
that reason.” 
 
These comments specifically about Obama are relevant because the underlying theme is that 
he sought out and pursued the youth vote, a central idea in this research. 
 
Campaigns: Strategic Decisions and Resource Allocation 
As in any campaign, candidates made strategic and resource allocation decisions in 
the Iowa caucuses. This section highlights conversations with campaign leadership and staff. 
Based on interviews, the Obama campaign put a significant amount of staff time and 
resources into the youth vote; the Edwards campaign, although limited in resources, targeted 
young people; and the Clinton campaign did not focus on the youth vote in any type of 
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systematic way. The one consensus area is that they worked hard to provide caucus education 
for their supporters, regardless of age. 
Strategy plays a significant role in youth outreach. One Clinton youth organizer in his 
interview stated: 
Conventional wisdom on the campaign is that no candidate has ever 
effectively increased turnout significantly and that Obama would be unlikely 
to do that. Remember Dean? Quite frankly, we wrote it off. Because of the 
early timing of the Iowa caucuses, we knew many college students would not 
be on campus to caucus. Historically, we also knew that youth don’t show up. 
It was a strategic decision that was made - our best supporters were women 
over 50 and that is what defined our field program. It was a resource 
allocation decision. 
 
In fact, two Clinton organizers were explicit that youth were not their target 
group. One field organizer in their interview stated:  
I don’t even know if I’m supposed to say this, but my regional field director 
specifically…when I got those results back from my intern about what people 
were saying in the (high) school, I wanted to organize around it and she told 
me not to.  And so I think that part of it was strategic on the campaign’s part, 
saying, ‘ You’re not even going to get them, so don’t waste your time.’  And 
so we didn’t. 
 
The Edwards campaign staff recalls: 
As we started the campaign, youth outreach was set as a priority. (As the 
campaign progressed) the youth vote had not been our strongest target as we 
were looking at research; therefore, we looked to the youth vote to expand our 
support in terms of persuasion and to build our volunteer and activist 
networks. The campaign also found that a wise strategy was the reach out to 
high school students in rural areas: I think we had an appeal in particular to 
many Iowa youth who had come from or continued to live in the more rural 
areas of the state in particular because they knew that John Edwards had also 
been in their shoes. In terms of resources, we were limited financially with 
what we could spend in Iowa due to public financing. Therefore we had to 
make some hard decisions, which did not allow us to spend as much money 
on youth outreach as we would have liked to. 
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In contrast, the Obama campaign had a full-time youth organizer with four field 
assistants, whose job was to “turn out youth voters, specifically those who attended 
educational institutions.” Part of Obama’s winning strategy was to identify new voters to the 
caucus to exceed past turnout. The most likely universes were young people, independents, 
and minorities. Toward that end, the Obama organizer in her interviews stated the following: 
I had a lot of resources. The senior staff was behind this program and the field 
staff bought into it. I got a lot of back up. Here’s an anecdotal story….when 
the campaign manager went door knocking with a brand new field organizer 
and they passed a high school and the campaign manger asked the field 
organizer if he had gone to the high school yet. The campaign manager said, 
that school is going to be the key to your success. In that precinct, on caucus 
night, Obama only got one delegate, but it was because 15 students came and 
got him enough to get him a delegate. While some people are quick to think 
we were wasting our time on youth, there are so many anecdotes where we 
picked up supporters because they were so excited to see young people 
attending meetings and events. 
 
Campaigns: Youth Strategy and Mobilization Techniques that Worked   
Trying to identify new youth supporters who are not registered to vote or who are 
registered in their home community is a challenge to youth organizers across the country. 
While there are 365 high schools and 60 colleges and universities in Iowa, there is no dataset 
that is readily available for campaigns to utilize for identification and persuasion purposes. 
Therefore, the way for campaigns to identify and persuade student supporters is to get them 
to come to you. 
Based on the interviews, high school outreach ran the spectrum from systematic to 
random. The Obama organizer explained the following about the campaign’s outreach: 
Our field organizers were given a goal to set up BarackStar chapters in all the 
Tier I and Tier II counties in Iowa. The goal of the BarackStar chapter was to 
help create a buzz and get additional students who would commit to caucus 
 66
for Senator Obama. We really let the local field organizers figure out within 
their region what worked best. Some students put entries in parades, others 
had bake sales for Barack, while others may have had one meeting.  We also 
always invited high school and college students to everything, and we always 
did a high school photo with Barack. The students took a photo with him and 
they were much more attached. We knew if they would caucus, who they 
would caucus for. 
Both the Edwards and Obama campaigns’ outreach focused on using young people as 
volunteers and both targeted rural high schools. When the caucuses were established, 
Democratic leaders set up a system that rewards individuals who campaign in rural areas. As 
Roger Simon of the Politico website (2008) describes it: 
The turnout in some precincts is so small that a single family--let's say four 
people--can determine the winner. In other precincts, only one person will 
show up and win for his candidate by being the only person in the room. In 
small-turnout caucus meetings, ties are resolved by a coin toss or drawing lots. 
In 2004, four precincts saw literally no one show up to vote in the Democratic 
caucus. Strategically, based on the caucus math, a caucus in rural Iowa is 
significant and could provide significant gains in the overall caucus math. 
In high schools across the state, students were just returning to school after winter 
break on caucus day, Thursday, January 3. The Obama campaign had a specific GOTV high 
school operation that worked diligently to provide a last-minute reminder to high school 
students and their government teachers. They provided high school students with stickers that 
said “Barack the Caucus” and sent out high school locker posters, “We wanted kids to have 
some way to show their support publicly within the confines of where they were,” stated the 
Obama youth organizer. 
Identifying supporters on college campuses presented more of a challenge. “Tabling, 
going to events, internet sign ups were the most common ways to gather data on college 
campuses,” said a Clinton organizer. The Obama youth director stated: 
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Bringing Senator Obama to college campuses was a great way to bring people 
in – to get them to hear.  Once we got them there and got them to hear, they 
would see the excitement and that they were a part of it. They never left 
without us obtaining their college and home addresses so we could follow up 
with them if school was not in session. 
 
In response to a particular Obama college event, the Clinton organizer stated:  
Obama had an advantage by coming in February for his announcement tour – 
not where he got all of his support but certainly a large group of people who 
liked him then stayed with him throughout. They didn’t really go to see other 
candidates. 
 
The Obama campaign had literature geared toward young people and a Students for 
Barack Obama DVD that they distributed to be shown at dorm meetings:  
We had our out-of-state college students for Obama chapters call Iowa college 
students to ask for their support and identify them and their support level. We 
got a decent amount of supporters out of it. We had the resources – all the out-
of-state students were anxious to help. The message from college students was 
‘we’re in this together.’ On caucus day, we also did GOTV specific calls to 
young people from out-of-state students which seemed a good way to remind 
them, ‘this is a student, our moment is now.’ 
 
The most commonly used outreach technique to young people was through internet 
communications such as email, social networking sites, and You Tube videos. Each 
campaign used email, and that was reflected in the individual surveys from the respondents. 
The Clinton, Edwards, and Obama campaigns all produced comical and inspirational videos, 
often posted on YouTube, which included celebrities encouraging people to caucus or get 
involved in some way. Some campaigns also used Facebook as an organizing tool. The 
Obama youth director said: 
I think that Facebook was absolutely amazing – we could create events and could 
communicate and build very quickly and always know what was going on. It helped 
us organization wise and we used it to get answers to questions. 
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John Edwards’ campaign also recognized the value of online media as well, “We spent a 
great deal of time focused on online networking, blogging, etc. in order to reach students in 
their own lives through mediums that they utilized most.” 
 
Campaigns: Candidate Time Devoted to Youth  
As mentioned earlier, campaigns must make strategic resource decisions which 
include how a candidate spends their time. In an assessment of how Senator Edwards used 
his time to reach out to youth, his campaign staffer said the following:  
We utilized Senator and Elizabeth Edwards time to reach out to the youth vote 
in a number of ways: town halls addressing education, brain drain, etc. 
targeting issues that students care most about; college forums and events; 
small clutches with students to talk about the campaign and issues that matter 
to them; phone calls from Senator Edwards and Elizabeth Edwards…(We had 
a) student group that helped advise the campaign with regular calls that 
Senator or Elizabeth Edwards participated on, regular blogging, and online 
activities to keep the youth updated on the campaign. 
 
Senator Obama’s campaign pointed to the high-school photos that he did at the end of 
each event in which they combined caucus training so that young people would leave having 
learned about the upcoming caucuses. They stressed that he always took questions: 
I always pushed for questions. Why? We didn’t want to take students for 
granted that they were automatically going to support Barack….We had to 
show them some type of concrete reasons for Barack….After seeing Barack, 
these high school students would go home to their Edwards parents or Hillary 
parents or Republican parents and their parents were going to challenge them. 
Kids don’t feel a lot of faith in the political world – and when they were 
inspired, well, we just wanted to give them some back up. They always left 
having heard from the candidate, taken a photo with him, and with some 
literature they could look at. 
 
Senator Clinton’s travel brought her to Iowa colleges and universities, but  
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often they were community events that were not necessarily geared toward college students. 
“The planting question thing made us a little more tentative,” stated the youth organizer for 
Senator Clinton. The organizer is referring to an incident that took place on November 6, 
2008, in Newton, Iowa, where a campaign aide planted a question to be asked of Senator 
Clinton which referred to a particular aspect of her campaign plan that the campaign wanted 
to highlight that day. For several days following, individuals and pundits referred to this 
event as “Plantgate.” 
 
Campaigns: The Candidates Image and Their Appeal to Youth? 
Young people also look at characteristics and qualities such as age and image in 
addition to their position on issues. This perception often seemed to impact the way they 
favorably or unfavorably viewed a candidate. In discussing whether young people were 
attracted to Senator Clinton, her organizer said the following: 
I don’t think they were. I think one of the problems we had was that the 
Obama campaign did a very effective branding of their candidate. Senator 
Clinton is difficult to make her seem young, hip, and cool. HRC can’t claim 
she isn’t a politician. He [Obama] connected more. He was a little different, 
the way some saw Bill Clinton as a generational candidate…I think younger 
students and younger females don’t have the same connection to HRC as older 
women do. They never really felt they were limited in any way or 
discriminated. 
 
Posing the same question to the Obama organizer, she responded, “He seems fresh; he seems 
new; he seems younger, not their parents’ age.” The Edwards campaign explained that he 
appealed to youth: 
Because John Edwards and Elizabeth Edwards took the time to listen to their 
concerns–through our policies, which addressed the issues that they cared 
most about including college for everyone, a rural revitalization act, etc. 
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Interest Groups: Their Role in Youth Voter Turnout 
Interest groups played an important supporting role to presidential campaigns in 
engaging and educating the caucus electorate. There were two different types of interest 
groups that were active during the Iowa caucuses. The civic participation groups such as 
Rock the Vote and New Voters Project mainly focused on voter registration and caucus 
participation, the former at high schools and the latter at the ten largest Iowa educational 
institutions. Other groups such as the ONE campaign, Save Darfur, and Iowans for Sensible 
Priorities targeted young people to attend their caucuses and support a particular issue. 
In an interview discussing their tactics, an organizer for New Voters Project stated the 
following: 
In April 2007 we announced a national campaign entitled ‘What’s your 
plan?’ to get presidential candidates talking about youth issues. We trailed 
candidates in Iowa at town hall meetings and through birdogging techniques, 
asked questions about how they will stop global warming and address the 
issue of college affordability. Students would ask the questions. This was both 
to show presidential candidates that youth were listening, and we also sought 
to grab media attention. We had over 20 conversations with presidential 
candidates. We had students who we recruited through pledge cards who 
asked the questions… 
 
The techniques of most of the groups required finding supporters who would invite them into 
their high school or college, as was the case of the New Voters Project:  
We did a class rap where you came into the class and a student or the New 
Voters Project staff will make a class announcement, pass out information, 
and fill out a pledge card to vote. The basic message was the New Voters 
message (of empowerment and involvement and making a difference). We 
had cards and asked people to identify the candidate(s) that they were 
interested in as well as to ask for volunteers. 
 
In the interview with Rock the Vote, one of the people involved in the Iowa field strategy 
stated the following:  
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Rock the Vote had previous experience in high school organizing. We found 
that if you can get inside the school, get inside for assemblies that will be the 
most successful mechanism. We targeted the largest schools in the largest 
cities (Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, Iowa City, Quad Cities). We tried to get 
into classrooms. It was touch and go – mostly cold calling – some teachers 
were much more receptive. Having the name Rock the Vote was always 
helpful. It was a brand. They know who you are and some of the most 
enthusiastic teachers understood the power of our brand and our organizing 
model. We pitched this as a ‘lets get information to your students about the 
caucus, how to caucus, and get them to pledge to attend the caucus.’ In some 
schools, we could do a five-minute presentation; in others, we could do an 
hour assembly. We always wanted to teach the basics, such as what is the 
caucus. It is a very confusing, hard to understand process, and if you don’t 
know where to go, what to bring you are much less likely to not attend. We 
worked to demystify the process. 
 
By far, the event that Rock the Vote was most proud of and found the most successful 
were the two after-school parties they held on caucus day:  
“We threw massive parties with DJs, allowed students to make your own 
public service announcements, had voting information, had pizza, and lots of 
materials. For some of these students, their caucus locations were in the 
school or library or in walking distance. We kept everyone there after school 
and then walked over to the caucus location. We had a few hundred students 
in each location. We were lucky; we had administration buy in and the student 
government promoted it. There was definitely an element of fun in this and 
there was the peer pressure element to this: if your neighbors and friends are 
going, you feel a little pressure to attend as well.” 
 
Rock the Vote, through its partnership with Facebook, also invited all eligible youth 
voters to caucus. Based on the number of young people who are online with Facebook, this 
was probably the largest single email to young voters in Iowa, who in most cases were not 
yet identified in the Secretary of State data since many were first- time voters. They also used 
the technology to post information about the caucuses, according to the Rock the Vote 
coordinator:  
Using the Facebook page, it was very interactive. They had to RSVP, but also 
this was a great place to get information, do wall posts, and use the message 
features.  The wall post feature was great – people would post questions or 
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comments. It was fun to watch peer-to-peer convincing taking place unfiltered 
right in front of your eyes. Young people were trying to convince and also had 
some very practical questions. This was another tool to allow people to 
interact but didn’t replace the necessary traditional organizing. 
 
The issue-based campaigns all used the same mechanism, which was a pledge card. 
In each case, they would identify supporters and ask them to commit to caucus for their cause 
by filling out a pledge card. Supporters were then contacted through calls and email to 
remind them to turn out and caucus for their issue and provide any information and details on 
the caucuses. Save Darfur and Iowans for Sensible Priorities had a much more targeted youth 
strategy, whereas the ONE campaign seemed to focus on youth as just one piece of their 
outreach puzzle. Each organization had different goals, but they ranged from finding 1,000 to 
10,000 supporters of their cause who would commit to participating in the 2008 Iowa 
caucuses. 
In each of these cases, these organizations had a limited budget, anywhere from one 
to five staff, and were provided some basic materials and “schwag,” those trinkets, tee-shirts, 
and things that groups hand out for visibility. Based on the expenditures put into the state and 
the conversations with staff, there was a recognition that their strategy was more topical and 
free media based than a serious attempt at massive grassroots mobilization. 
This is the story of Democratic youth voter turnout in the 2008 Iowa caucuses. If the 
general election contest stays on the trajectory of an Obama – McCain race in the fall, there 
will be numerous state narratives written about youth voter turnout in the primaries and what, 
if any, implications it had on the 2008 presidential general election. 
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Chapter 6.  Discussion 
The interconnected stories of Iowa’s young caucus –goers, presented in the prior 
section, confirms my speculation that youth voters, when mobilized with specific research 
tested techniques, increase their caucus participation rate. To be clear, there are many 
underlying variables that influence the decision of young people to participate in the political 
process. This analysis recognizes the role that family, media, religion, socioeconomic status 
political party affiliation and the nature of the times play in shaping individual opinions and 
attitudes to participate. The significance of my work and its contributions to theory 
development will be to identify what techniques were most effective in getting young people 
to participate in the caucuses. Further, the story recounted by young Iowans brings home the 
point that young voters in Iowa are really not that different than regular voters, except in the 
medium or mechanism through which they are contacted. 
This section begins with several overarching themes that have broad implications and 
support the overall theory that particular outreach techniques increased voter turnout in the 
caucuses. First, each age group - high school, college and young professionals responded to 
different types of voter mobilization techniques depending on their station in life. Next, the 
social nature of the caucus led young people to genuinely enjoy the political process. Also, 
political campaigns recognized the importance of improving the political efficacy of all 
voters. Lastly, campaign resources were allocated to youth voter turnout in varying degrees 
depending on their significance to the larger campaign plan. The discussion section 
concludes with an analysis of the individual research questions. 
High school students took their job as an Iowa caucus-goer very seriously. In large 
part due to the media hype and attention, these students recognized the value and the honor 
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of the role they were able to play in being an eligible caucus-goer. Toward that end, as 
inspectors of presidential candidates, they attended events, asked questions, spoke with their 
friends and parents, and remain involved and keenly aware of the upcoming general election.   
What was also striking was how many high school students were surprised at my 
historical comments on youth voter apathy and how irrelevant and non-descriptive they were 
of their generation - the Millennials. When students were invited to be a part of the process, 
they willingly and logically rose to the challenge. These students have actively been involved 
in their school and community, and several had volunteered or interned for a political 
candidate during the school year. Individuals were given an opportunity to serve in campaign 
leadership roles for their high schools and that assisted in teaching leadership skills to a new 
generation. This is important because it provides further evidence to the argument provided 
by Harvard Institute of Politics and The Center for Information and Research on Civic 
Learning & Engagement that the Millennial generation is paving a broader path in activism 
beyond just volunteering and civic activity such as signing petitions, but specifically in the 
political act of voting over the past three elections (2004, 2006, 2008). It also provides 
potential good news for increased voting rates and the Millennial Generation. The 
generational theory put forth by Craig and Bennett (1997) states that those with a strong 
attachment to the political process developed early in life remain called to participate in 
record numbers throughout their lives. 
As we move from high school to college students, the research collected tells a 
slightly different story of campaign activism. It is difficult to know exactly how many of the 
18.5-29 year olds who caucused were college students, yet the impression is that their 
campaign involvement heavily utilized social networking sites. The on-the-ground operations 
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were dependent on the activity level of the student leadership established at each college and 
university. While each campus had a field organizer who was responsible for a particular 
geographic area, it seems that there was a lack of on campus leadership to help channel and 
focus the necessary peer-to-peer interaction on college campuses. This is not to say that 
college students did not caucus or were not active, but instead to point out that the contextual 
situation they were in could have impacted their caucus experience dramatically. These 
students may have been more likely to sign up for Facebook groups or be involved in email 
persuasion and less likely to show up to a group meeting on campus. In terms of the bigger 
picture, the one thing that was clear from the college students is that they were asked to 
participate, they valued that and factored that into their decision making process. Most 
typically, the ask was in the form of a candidate coming to their institution or the campaign 
staff or student groups asking them to be involved. 
As we move next to young professionals, it is important to remember that many of the 
participants in the focus group had attended a presidential caucus in 2000 or 2004. What was 
extremely evident and distinguished this experience from their former elections was that 
campaigns sought out young professionals as a group and tried to engage them in the 
political process while recognizing their station in life. The notion that a campaign would 
come to them, ask them to provide input on the issues that were on their minds and create a 
social setting to channel this behavior was held in high regard by young professionals. The 
assertion that campaigns identified specific avenues to reach out to high school and college 
students and young professionals is of critical importance to and supports my speculation that 
techniques and outreach should be specific to the audience and age group. 
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Young people had fun at the caucuses. While it is not critical that there is a 
correlation between civic duty and entertainment value, it was certainly helpful to encourage 
and continue to pull people into the political process. This result supports the work of 
Elizabeth Addonizio (2006) which recognized the correlation between political participation 
and the social aspect of the political act. As a result of a good first experience during the 
caucus process, it could be speculated that these young people will return to the polls again in 
the fall and in future caucuses and elections if mobilized and inspired.  
In using the thoughts of Matthews (1994), campaigns sought to engage individuals in 
non-typical ways. They held community service drives such as Earth Day Action rallies 
where they planted trees. They sought to engage them in a conversation about issues by 
holding policy roundtables with the candidate, policy experts, or staff. These efforts support 
Hansen’s (1985) conclusion that people get involved where there are political opportunity 
structures accessible and available to them. Research based techniques such as face-to-face 
discussions and conversations about youth agendas proposed by Strachan (2007) were 
effectively implemented. As stated in my research question, providing young people 
alternative avenues to participate in a social setting recognizes the value that young people 
place on social networking and peer-to-peer opportunities. 
Campaigns recognized the value of improving individual political efficacy in young 
voters. In an effort to improve internal political efficacy, they implemented training programs 
to assist an individual in feeling confident about the political act of caucusing. This confirms 
the work of Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) which shows that voters are more likely to 
participate in the election if they feel confident in their political knowledge. Toward that end, 
a significant part of the caucus strategy was to educate supporters on the candidate, the 
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issues, and the process, usually in that order. The interviews with young professionals also 
confirm that the message that resonated most was a change in course from the direction the 
country was heading. One could speculate that in supporting a candidate who sought to 
change Washington and end the war in Iraq, the candidate improved their external political 
efficacy or belief in responsiveness of political institutions to individual demands. 
Young people were very focused on the issue discussions between the candidates. 
The war dominated the issue discussion, but was followed closely with the economy and 
health care, and similarly reflected the research of Tedesco, McKinney, and Kaid (2007) in 
their issue salience study. While individuals have the same issues of importance, they tended 
to look at it through different lenses depending on their age and perspective. With young 
people, the relevance of the war often from the perspective of that of their friends who might 
be going to war or the way the world perceived us. Older individuals may view the war and 
the way they think about it using a moral or economic framework. Young people confirmed 
my theoretical assertion that when provided meaningful, effective opportunities for training 
and political information, they will take advantage of those opportunities. 
Campaigns recognized the role that political socialization played in the development 
of individual attitudes. Individual viewpoints had been shaped and impacted by family 
members, teachers, and churches long before the presidential candidates came rolling into 
Iowa. The interviews clearly point to the important role that family members and teachers 
played in the caucus education process. This data supports past findings by (McClurg 2003) 
and Nickerson (2008) about the role of family and friends in political affiliation and 
candidate support. Recognizing the role of the influence of parents and teachers, campaigns 
encouraged young supporters to reach out to their parent or grandparent or teacher to talk 
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about their support of a particular candidate. However, several anecdotes confirmed that 
while parents and teachers expected them to go to the caucus, there was more dissention in 
the ranks this year over which candidate each family member would support. While it was 
not a large part of the discussion, individual interviews confirm that this election may have 
caused families to choose different political parties and different candidates within those 
political parties. Regardless of who supported what candidate, peer-to-peer contact was 
encouraged by the campaign as a valuable persuasion tactic. 
Presidential campaigns made strategic choices given the time and resources available 
to them. Systematic, targeted mobilization of young people in their educational and social 
settings effectively increased youth voter turnout. Therefore, while every campaign may have 
had at least a token youth strategy, the interviews provided a much clearer picture indicating 
that some candidates put more time and resources into the promise of high school students, 
college students, and young professionals than others based on their strategic value to the 
campaign. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have described their mobilization theory as a two-
way street in that it is necessary to have strategic mobilization and individual motivation. The 
techniques and avenues that campaigns in Iowa utilized to engaged youth voters combined 
with the energy and enthusiasm that young people exuded for their candidates was an 
excellent example of the “two-way street.” Campaigns used direct and indirect mobilization 
techniques to activate supporters. Direct mobilization techniques such as person–to-person 
contact through door-to-door canvassing and other peer-to-peer forms of communication 
such as Facebook and email.  Even more successfully, campaigns indirectly mobilized 
individuals by relying on individuals who are centrally positioned within large social 
networks. They identified people who were well respected with large networks of friends and 
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sought to persuade them to support their candidate. Examples of this include contacting the 
senior class president, the captain of the football team, the college sorority president or the 
head of a young professionals or young lawyers group. 
Next, the research questions are answered. 
 
Research Question 1: Did peer-to-peer contact and social networking opportunities 
increased youth attendance at the Iowa caucuses. 
What was evident in the discussions was that peer-to-peer contact among high school 
students, college students, and young professionals were quite organic in nature. Since the 
Iowa caucuses had attracted so much attention, it was a common discussion topic in 
classrooms, dorms, and bars all across the state. The conversations show that teachers, 
parents, and friends alike were tuned into Iowa politics and prepared to have conversations 
about the candidates and the process. Campaigns, however, served as the catalyst and were 
responsible for setting the goals and providing the infrastructure for those who wanted to be 
involved in a systematic peer-to-peer voter outreach plan.  
Campaigns, to various degrees, provided the goals for young people who wanted to 
be involved. Most notable was the systematic structure of the Obama youth outreach plan, in 
which each “station in life” had a field plan with specific goals. The high school plan was to 
create BarackStar chapters in Tier I and II counties and to find 20 members who would 
commit to attend the caucus. They were provided with incentives, “schwag,” and youth-
specific information about the candidate to support the chapter. Obama’s secondary 
education outreach plan was to create a campus chapter at the sixty largest educational 
institutions, while the young professionals plan included hosting some type of social event in 
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each of the Top 10 metropolitan counties. The specificity and measurability of the plan is 
important to point out, because the difference between the Obama campaign and the Clinton 
and Edwards campaigns appears to be that the Obama campaign aggressively pursued these 
goals as a necessity to meet their win goal, while the Clinton and Edwards campaign 
responded rather than pursuing interest from high school students, college students, and 
young professionals. To be clear, this is not saying that the Clinton and Edwards campaign 
did not do any youth outreach. As the research shows, they did reach out into the youth 
community; however the distinction I am drawing is that it was not systematic, and without 
tangible, measurable, and specific tasks and goals. 
Young people are online, regularly reading their email and checking Facebook and 
My Space on a regular basis. The ability of the user to check friends’ online profiles, see 
what groups they joined, and what events they are attending, allows young people, in an 
indirect way, to announce the candidate they were supporting.  
The interviews and research provide reinforcement to James Q. Wilson’s theory 
(1973) that people participate to maintain or strengthen friendships or social interaction 
through receipt of solidary rewards. The number of individuals who went to the caucuses 
with friends, or at the request of friends, or participated in some type of social event prior to 
or upon conclusion of the caucuses strongly supports this idea. 
As the caucus was so well publicized by the media, it had the feel of an event that 
young people did not want to miss that was unique to Iowa. As evidenced by the comments 
about sorority girls attending the caucus and Rock the Vote pre-caucus parties, these events 
took on a social feel. This is not to say that people did not comprehend the seriousness of the 
event, because the youth who took two hours of their time to attend the caucus obviously 
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assessed the costs and benefits associated with their participation. The perception, whether 
hyped or real, was that the caucuses were the thing to do in Iowa on January 3. Information 
and stories provided support for the idea that social networking and peer-to-peer contact 
influenced young individuals’ decisions to participate in the Iowa Democratic caucuses.  
 
Research Question 2: Did voter training make the caucus process seem simple and 
accessible?  
Research shows that the greater the internal efficacy of an individual, the more likely 
her or she is to participate. Campaigns did an excellent job training individuals for the 
purpose of improving their political information, or internal efficacy, with the end result of 
youth attendance and participation.  
To that end, the parties spoke about the caucus as a simple, easy process. Each 
campaign tried to outdo the other with funny videos, five-point fact sheets, mock caucuses, 
or other techniques to make the caucuses seem accessible. One campaign offered free 
babysitting (Obama), another campaign brought platters of food to the caucuses so missing 
dinner was not a barrier to participation (Clinton), while another campaign provided snow 
shovels in case there was a snow storm on January 3 (Clinton). The campaigns were acutely 
aware that there were a lot of barriers to participation in the Iowa caucuses and worked hard 
to alleviate any burdens on the individual caucus-goers.  
With a large number of supporters who had not caucused before, the campaigns were 
running a multiple track campaign to ensure that the caucus-goer was effectively informed 
about what to expect. Most campaigns had help phone lines set up if people had questions at 
the last minute, could not find their caucus location, or were confused about the process. In 
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addition, the campaign precinct captains had been trained on the intricacies of the caucus 
rules and eligibility issues that might arise on caucus evening.  
Campaigns were creative in using incentives to get their supporters educated about 
the caucus process. Using varying techniques which appealed to multiple learning styles, 
individuals were able to improve their political efficacy by learning about the caucus process 
in large groups or in the comfort of their own home. 
The Obama campaign effectively used surrogate Oprah Winfrey as an education tool. 
If people wanted to receive tickets to the campaign event featuring Winfrey, they had to 
attend a caucus training session. At the event, they watched a “skit” about the caucus process. 
Iowans for Sensible Priorities held a “how to caucus” contest and asked for video entries 
with the winner being emailed out to a large membership list. All groups utilized  educational 
strategies by making the caucus training interactive through use of a mock caucus. In these 
mock caucuses, individuals actually went through the process of making a public declaration 
about some type of item and became comfortable with the agenda and actions caucus night 
would entail. This information supports the idea that voter training improved internal 
political efficacy and led to increased turnout among Democratic youth caucus-goers. 
 
Research Question 3: Did young voters attend the 2008 Iowa caucuses because they 
were asked and felt wanted? 
Presidential candidates who campaign in Iowa have a long standing tradition of 
“courting” Iowa’s caucus-goers. The candidates take the time to get to know these 
individuals, to hear their ideas and concerns, and to share their vision for the country.  Prior 
presidential candidates, such as Howard Dean in 2004, worked to establish a systematic 
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youth outreach program in Iowa. Presidential campaigns of the past have made efforts to 
reach youth voters through youth organizations on campus. However, a great deal of what a 
campaign or candidate did in Iowa was based on targeting and strategy using a list of past 
Iowa caucus-goers and their voting history. Therefore, Iowa’s youth had long been ignored 
not only because they did not participate as much, but because they were not typical caucus-
goers and often not on the voter registration or caucus attendee lists provided to campaigns. 
Pertinent to my research is the “neglection” theory postulated by Richard Thau, which cites a 
cycle of neglect that takes place when politicians do not pay much attention to young adults 
because they do not vote enough; and young adults non-voting because they do not know 
enough and candidates and political ad campaigns ignore them. The most striking and 
conclusive information comes from participants who caucused because a candidate asked 
them to caucus. To be clear, this is not to say that they caucused blindly for the first person 
who asked, but young people paid careful attention to the candidate that most effectively 
reached out to them in their station in life. 
The 2008 Iowa caucus process saw some presidential candidates parading in front of 
youth the way they parade in front of powerful Democratic voting blocs such as American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL CIO) and League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC). Indeed, this information is telling us that young voters should be approached and 
asked to get involved in the political process because the asking makes the difference. One of 
the most significant reasons for increased caucus participation among young people is 
because they were asked or invited into the process.  
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On final reflection, beyond the story of youth voter participation in the Iowa 
caucuses, it is important to note that overall voter turnout in the caucus process in Iowa 
almost doubled. This is significant because the same old strategies implemented by Iowa 
caucus campaigns of the past were not enough this year. “New” people and “young” people, 
traditionally nonvoters, became the secret weapon of presidential campaigns. 
Young people participated at the same rate as older Iowans. “In Iowa, youth were 
22% of the electorate, outperforming their share of eligible voters and comprising a higher 
portion of the electorate than the so-called reliable seniors” (Connery 2007). This provides an 
individual case that contradicts Verba and Nie’s (1972) findings that older people tend to 
vote more than younger people. This year, traditional nonvoters heard a different voice. 
Young people, while only one part of the targeted population for a winning strategy, were 
one of the key universes Senator Obama focused on to add new participants to the caucus 
process.   
Over the next several decades, political scientists will look at the 2008 caucus turnout 
to assess if the numbers were an outlier or an emerging trend. It is imperative that they 
recognize that this was not just the story of Barack Obama, but more important, it was the 
story of how candidates and campaigns understood that all voters want to be asked, all 
respond to the same research tested mobilization theories, and young voters respond best to 
candidates who find them in their “station in life.” 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion  
The increase in youth voter turnout in Iowa has broad, urgent implications for our 
country.  Imagine a society where youth voters are voting at the same rate as older voters and 
the ramifications on the public policy and the political process are powerful.  
First and foremost, the political terrain and roadmap to victory for candidates who 
seek elected office is no longer safe and obvious. It requires candidates to be in touch with 
the issues and ideas of a broader electorate and less able to be manipulated by special 
interests and powerful interest groups.  
Second, youth voters who expand the electorate imply increased power in the hands 
of the Democratic Party. Youth voters of the late 20th Century and the present are typically 
more open minded and politically moderate to somewhat liberal. An expanded progressive 
electorate that seems to be more open and tolerant than its predecessors means the White 
House, United States Congress, and statehouses across the country will look even more like 
the America in which we live.  
Third, an expanded electorate to include young people will elect multicultural, 
gender-balanced leadership that can more accurately pinpoint the issues our expanding 
country is facing. It will force meaningful debates on significant public policy issues such as 
immigration and trade that have been left on the sidelines as political hot potatoes. Since 
elections are no longer guaranteed, real action will be demanded and politicians held 
accountable. 
Lastly, for many voters, what began as a first time “civic act” becomes a lifelong 
civic skill. With increased internal political efficacy, individuals are more likely to become 
recurrent voters, and also more active in their local communities and churches. This simple 
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act has the potential to rekindle the individual desire to be connected to a larger community 
and increased associational life. 
 In approaching this research question, my goal was to provide knowledge that would 
have a cumulative effect that could continue to advance scientific research in the field of 
political science. My research confirms that there is something happening out there, and it is 
the changing face of youth political activism. Toward that end, I have provided a brief insight 
into the types of techniques that campaigns are using and the way individual high school 
students, college students, and young professionals perceive these techniques. I think the 
most obvious, yet meaningful conclusion, is that when young people are asked to participate 
in the political process, they do. 
While my research is qualitative and does not withstand the large n survey data test to 
make generalizations, there does seem to be a significant relationship between increased 
Democratic youth voter turnout and the role campaigns and candidates played in 
orchestrating peer-to-peer contact and voter training opportunities. These findings support 
my proposition that voter turnout in the Iowa Democratic caucuses increased because 
research tested mobilization techniques, specific to young people, were implemented in an 
effective and systematic way in Iowa to communicate to young voters.  In sum, the focus 
group, interviews and surveys conducted for this project give us a good picture of this 
phenomenon, one that will need to be confirmed by subsequent research. 
In thinking through the information gathering process I utilized in this project, there 
are four recommendations for future replication. First, recognize that high school students, 
college students and young professionals are at different stations in life and hold three 
different focus groups reflective of that. To the degree that it is possible, meet with these 
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individuals on their “turf,” – such as local high schools, colleges, and in the case of young 
professionals, after work in a social setting. Second, to accurately measure the effectiveness 
of particular techniques, utilize an over time research approach that does not only rely on a 
snapshot in time upon conclusion of the event. This technique may be useful in helping to 
draw out things which were more or less influential during the voter decision making 
process. Third, use extreme caution when interviewing human subjects, especially minors. 
When conducting research in an educational association, especially a high school, the 
consent of the Superintendent, as well as the school, in addition to approval from the subject 
and their parents is strongly recommended. Most institutions have research policies in place 
which require you to seek prior approval to collect information on their students. Last, 
include government teachers or educators who could speak to the civic skills and civic 
training process taking place in the classrooms which could speak more broadly to how 
outside groups are assisting in influencing internal political efficacy. In providing a brief 
overview of lessons learned, I now turn to focus on future areas of research. 
While this case study focused solely on Democratic caucus participants, it warrants 
the question, “How different would your results have been if you had been able to talk to 
Republican caucus-goers, youth activists and staff?” History recalls that Democrats have not 
always been the winner of the youth vote. In the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections, 
Presidents Reagan and Bush both won over 50% of the youth vote. While the pool of 
Republican youth caucus attendees was smaller in 2008, it is quite possible that the two of 
the three assumptions would hold true. It warrants further investigation to confirm if peer to 
peer contact and the candidate ask improved youth participation. The one element that may 
 88
not increase turnout for Republicans is caucus training, as the nature of their caucuses are 
quite straightforward and similar to regular voting and require limited caucus education. 
An additional area of research specific to certain youth voters would be to focus on 
the lesser known, neglected populations within the youth vote. Specifically, there is a 
plethora of research on college age voters, yet very little research information on high school 
students and young professionals. In high schools, the role that campaigns and civic groups 
play in engaging young people in the class room could be measured. The role that the 
government teacher plays in content education and civic skill training could be analyzed. A 
specific study of this voting group could help identify the role that social networking or peer 
to peer influence plays in the voter decision making process. 
Lastly, in highlighting the past research of Elizabeth Addonizio (2006) and enhancing 
the interviews with Rock the Vote, what specific roles do “parties at the caucuses” play in 
increasing caucus turnout. This research could assess the role that campaigns and civic 
groups played in putting together such events. A research question could ascertain if it was 
more successful to gather people together in a neighborhood and then caucus together, or if 
instead, it was more effective to have people caucus, and then socialize upon ending. 
 In conclusion, it will be incredibly helpful to continue research in the area of youth 
voter mobilization techniques. As researchers continue to assess what the most predictable 
variable is in determining voter turnout, there are two factors which must be recognized. 
First, the presidential candidate and the nature of the times will impact youth voter turnout. 
Will Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama draw different responses than John McCain or John 
Kerry? The candidates themselves are a very significant causal factor in youth voter turnout. 
Second, the time and resources that a campaign or party puts into the youth vote will impact 
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turnout. I believe that any outreach pays some dividends, regardless of the candidate. 
However, the overlay of a “youth candidate” pays extremely high dividends for the campaign 
and the candidate. 
I became a government teacher because I was passionate about involving young 
people in the political process. As someone who has worked in government and on political 
campaigns, I seem to continuously go back and forth between employment in education, 
government, and politics. In the winter of 2007, in large part because of my passion to 
involve young people in the political process, I made the decision to begin work with Senator 
Barack Obama’s presidential campaign. While I was teaching in the spring semester, I served 
as a part-time adviser to the campaign and then began full time as the senior Iowa adviser for 
Senator Obama. I served in that position through the end of the Iowa caucuses. Since then, I 
have served in a variety of other capacities with the Obama campaign. 
I believe this disclosure is important, because much of the information shared in this 
research points to things that the Obama campaign did right in its outreach to young people. I 
want to be clear that all of this information and research was done in an unbiased fashion and 
outreach was done to individuals who were employed by or supported all the Democratic 
candidates. I would encourage anyone who is concerned about such bias to review 
comments, poll numbers, and observations well noted in the polls and by the punditry on a 
regular basis regarding Senator Obama’s appeal to youth. 
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Appendix A  Focus Group Moderator Guide 
 
1. Sign In – Receive Name Tag. Point Out Bathrooms. Point out refreshments 
 
2. Welcome. Thank you for coming. (00:00:00) 
 
3. Announcements and information on session length. 
 
4. Introduction and Role of the Moderator 
 
5. Broad Statement of the Objective of the Group 
“We are here to have a discussion about techniques used by presidential campaigns and civic 
groups and individual motivations for going to the Iowa caucuses. The purpose of this study 
is to study the reasons youth voter turnout (age 17 ½ - 29) increased from 4% in 2004 to 13% 
in Iowa’s 2008 precinct caucuses. This study will identify the use of different voter 
mobilization techniques and their effectiveness.” 
 
6. Introduction of the use of audio. 
 
7. Explanation that the objective of the group is to obtain the participants’ feelings about 
specific topics. 
 
8. Give participants some sense of the rules for the group. 
“One person talking at a time, no side conversations, speak loud, make sure everyone has a 
chance to be heard, seek to hear the truth so be respectful of all opinions and ideas.” 
 
9. Introductions (First Name, Where they live, Where they caucused) 
 
10. Warm Up Question 
“As you know, youth voter turnout (described as age 17 ½ - 29) increased in Iowa during the 
presidential caucuses, can you think of reasons why that might be the case?” 
 
11. Specific Topic Discussion 
What different ways did you use to stay informed about the candidates and the caucus 
process? 
 
Of those discussed, which do you think you relied on most heavily for information? 
 
Did you interact with any groups that wanted to talk about caucusing as opposed to a 
candidate? Can you recall their name? 
 
What was the message they used? 
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What do you think was the most significant technique in reaching out to you to obtain your 
support or get you to caucus? Why? 
 
What do you think was the least effective or most annoying way of reaching out to you? 
Why? 
 
How often did you talk about presidential politics or caucusing with your friends? Give 
examples? 
 
What candidate do you think specifically spoke to you as a young person and how did they 
do it? 
 
If you have to provide one piece of advice to candidate on how best to reach out to you, what 
would you suggest? 
 
Probing and Poking based on flow of conversation. 
 
12. Closing Statement and Thanks 
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Appendix B  Principal Investigator Individual Interview Guide 
What is your name and title? 
 
What is the name of your organization? 
 
What is its purpose/mission? 
 
What is its funding source? 
 
What techniques did you use to turn out youth voters? 
 
Specific Examples reviewed. 
 
What techniques do you believe were most effective? 
 
What type of expenditure did you use for this project? 
 
How do you determine if it was “worth the money?” 
 
Anecdotally, from your work, what do you think are the most effective ways to reach out to 
individuals? 
 
Can you give me a specific example? 
 
What do you think are the least effective ways to reach out to individuals? 
 
Can you give me a specific example? 
 
For Campaign Specific: 
 
How much staff did you devote towards this effort? 
 
What type of budget or resources did you use? 
 
How much candidate time did you put towards youth outreach? 
 
If yes, did it “pay off?” 
 
What lesson learned would you want to share? 
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Appendix C   ISU Pre/Post Caucus 2008 Poll 
 
Iowa Caucus Poll  
January 2008 
Selected Questions Only 
 
 
 
2.  As you know, the Democratic and Republican Caucuses were held in Iowa on January 3rd 
of this year to assist in selecting candidates for the Presidential election in November. 
 
Did you attend an Iowa Caucus on January 3rd? 
 
1= Yes 
2= No   Æ  [IF NO, GO TO Q11.] 
 
 
3.  Did you attend the Democratic Caucus or the Republican Caucus? 
 
1 = Democratic Caucus 
2 = Republican Caucus 
 
4.  Did you attend the caucus in Ames, Iowa City, or someplace else? 
 
1 = Ames 
2 = Iowa City 
3 = Other (Specify:________________________________________ ) 
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8.  Did you change your support to a different candidate . . . 
  
Yes No 
a. because your original choice did not have enough support from 
other caucus attendees? 1 2 
b. 
because other caucus attendees or presenters 
persuaded you to change your support to another 
candidate? 
1 2 
c. 
because you learned information about your original 
choice that influenced you to support another 
candidate? 
1 2 
d. 
because you realized that more of your friends or 
neighbors were supporting another candidate? 
1 2 
e. because of another reason? 1 2 
f. IF YES TO Q8e:  (Why did you change your support to another candidate?) 
 
OPEN TEXT 
 
 
9.  Which one of the following issues was the most important in your decision to support 
your candidate at the Caucus?   Was it your candidate’s position on . . .   
 
PROBE FOR ONE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE 
 
1 = the Iraq war,  
2 = terrorism, 
3 = health care,  
4 = social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, 
5 = education, 
6 = immigration,  
7 = the environment,  
8 = or economic issues? 
9 = NONE OF THESE, ANOTHER ISSUE NOT LISTED 
10 = NO ONE ISSUE, COMBINATION 
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10.  Which one of the following characteristics was the most important in your decision to 
support your candidate at the Caucus?  Was it your candidate’s . . .  
 
PROBE FOR ONE MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC 
 
1 = personal integrity,  
2 = experience,  
3 = ability to win the election,  
4 = or position on the issues? 
5 = NONE OF THESE, ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC NOT LISTED 
6 = NO ONE CHARACTERISTIC, COMBINATION 
 
13.  Which one of the following issues is the most important in your decision to support your 
candidate?  Is it your candidate’s position on . . .   
 
PROBE FOR ONE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE 
 
1 = the Iraq war,  
2 = terrorism, 
3 = health care,  
4 = social issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, 
5 = education, 
6 = immigration,  
7 = the environment,  
8 = or economic issues? 
9 = NONE OF THESE, OTHER ISSUES 
10 = NO ONE ISSUE, COMBINATION 
 
 
14.  Which one of the following characteristics is the most important in your decision to 
support your candidate?  Is it your candidate’s . . .  
 
PROBE FOR ONE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE 
 
1 = personal integrity,  
2 = experience,  
3 = ability to win the election,  
4 = or position on the issues? 
5 = NONE OF THESE, ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC NOT LISTED 
6 = NO ONE CHARACTERISTIC, COMBINATION 
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31.  Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or something else? 
 
1 = Democrat 
2 = Republican 
3 = Independent 
4 = Something else:  (Specify: __________________________________ ) 
 
IF Q31 = INDEPENDENT OR SOMETHING ELSE, GO TO Q33. 
 
 
32a.  IF Q31 = DEMOCRAT, ASK:   Do you think of yourself as a strong Democrat, a 
moderate Democrat, or leaning toward Independent? 
 
1 = Strong  
2 = Moderate  
3 = Leaning toward Independent 
 
33.  How would you describe your views on most political matters?  Would you say you are 
Very Liberal, Somewhat Liberal, Moderate, Somewhat Conservative, or Very 
Conservative? 
 
1 = Very Liberal 
2 = Somewhat Liberal 
3 = Moderate 
4 = Somewhat Conservative 
5 = Very Conservative 
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Appendix D Youth Voter Survey 
 
Youth Voter Survey 
Please write legibly. Please circle or x your response.  
 
1. What is your birth date ?    __/__/__ 
 
2. What is your gender?      
  
3. Did you attend the Democratic Caucus on January 3?  
 
4. Did you need to register to vote at the caucus?   
 
5. Did you need to change parties in order to caucus?  
 
6. If yes, what political affiliation were you registered with?  
 
7. Who did you caucus for?  
 
  Biden     Clinton     Dodd     Edwards     Obama    Richardson 
 
8. If your candidate did not have enough support to be considered viable, who did you caucus 
for? 
 
  Biden     Clinton     Dodd     Edwards     Obama    Richardson 
 
9. What was the primary reason you chose to attend the caucus? 
 
 Civic Responsibility/Duty   Peer Pressure/Social     The Candidate 
  
          
10. During the campaign season, which of the following techniques were used to encourage 
you to support a candidate? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a.   Mail: Personal Letter asking you to support a candidate 
  
  
b.   Mail: Brochure 
  
 
c.   Email: From a Friend or Peer (someone your age) 
  
 
d.  Email: From Candidate or Candidate Representative 
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e.  Email: From a “Celebrity”.  
 If yes, who was the “celebrity?”  
  
f.  Text Message 
  
g. Cell Phone Call: From a Friend or Peer (someone your age) 
 
h. Cell Phone Call: From a Volunteer 
  
i. Campus Phone Call: From a Friend or Peer (someone your age) 
 
j. Campus Phone Call: From a Volunteer 
  
k. Automated Message “Robo Call” On Message Machine 
  
l. Automated Message “Robo Call” on Message Machine – From Candidate or Candidate 
Representative 
  
m. Automated Message “Robo Call” on Message Machine – From a “Celebrity” 
 If yes, who was the “celebrity?”____________________________ 
  
n. Flyer/Leaflet on your door 
  
o. Someone came to your door to speak with you 
  
p. Vote Poking 
 
q. Facebook Message 
  
r. MySpace Message 
 
s. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: by someone you know – by 
email 
  
t. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: by someone you know – by 
phone 
  
u. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: by someone you know – in 
person 
  
v. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: by email 
  
w. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: by phone 
 
x. Invitation to see the Candidate/Candidate Representative: in person 
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11. Rank the three most effective techniques in reaching out to you. (1 being the most 
effective) 
  1. 
  2. 
  3. 
 
12. Rank the least effective techniques in reaching out to you. (6 being the least effective) 
 
  4. 
  5. 
  6. 
 
13. Did you contribute to a candidate? Yes No 
 
14. If yes, which candidate did you contribute to?  
 
Biden     Clinton     Dodd     Edwards     Obama   Richardson 
 
15. How much was your contribution? ___________________________ 
 
16. Did you visit a candidate website? Yes No 
 
17. Did you read any blogs?   Yes No 
 
18. Did you personally blog?   Yes No 
 
19. Was there anything specific (web feature, technique, organization) that you still 
remember about a candidate website? 
 
20. What policy do you associate most with the candidate you support? (Circle One) 
 
Health Care Environment War Economy Reform/Change of System   
 
Education 
 
21. Did any candidate specifically address why YOU as a young person should caucus? 
 
 Yes No 
 
 
 
22. Did any candidate/campaign TRY to explain how the caucuses work?   
 
 Yes No 
 
 109
23. If yes, how did they do it? 
 
Brochure Video         Email           In Person Training Phone Call Exp. 
 
24. Did you have any conversations with your friends or peers about the process?  
 
 Yes No 
 
25. Did you try to persuade anyone to support your candidate?    
 
 Yes No 
 
26. Did you invite anyone to attend the caucus with you?     
 
 Yes No 
 
27. Did you know people at your caucus?       
 
 Yes No       
  
28. Did you attend your caucus at your college precinct or home precinct?  
 
 College Home 
 
29. Did you do something social (dinner) before or after the caucuses?  
 
 Yes  No 
 
30. Which candidate do you believe most effectively reached out to young people? 
 
Biden     Clinton     Dodd     Edwards     Obama    Richardson 
        
 
31. Why? 
 
32. Would you like to provide any additional comments on specific reasons why you as a 
young person supported the candidate that you did? 
 
 
 
 
 
